Booking Holdings (BKNG) — PoorCharlie Research Report

Price ~$168 · today

Market cap $129,738M ~775M shares post-split (-4% YoY)

Enterprise value ~$132B Net debt ~$2.4B; cash $16.5B

Overall score 81 Strong · out of 100

Score breakdown

81/100

Strong

Moat

18/20

Five-layer moat: two-sided network (4.4M properties ↔ 1.2B room nights), Genius loyalty, payments infrastructure ($130B merchant volume), proprietary data, regulatory complexity (DSA/DMA/etc named by acronym).

Management

17/20

Fogel 25yrs at company, $92.4M personal stake, record $3.6B Q1 buyback into his own guidance cut. Said-vs-delivered beat high end of guidance every quarter for 8 calls running. -3 for undisclosed succession.

Business risk

13/20

Middle East conflict drags Q2 to +2–4% room nights; full-year guide assumes ~4-month impact then recovery. AI disintermediation a tail risk but well-defended. European concentration ~50% of room nights.

Key ratios

20/20

Universe-leading: ROIC 47%, 3yr ROIIC 180%, ROCE 81%, FCF margin ~33%, EBITDA margin record 36.9%, share count -5.6%/yr, EPS +22% FY25. FCF yield ~7.0%. The numbers do not get cleaner than this.

Valuation

13/20

~14.9x FCF vs 10yr median 19.8x — ~25% discount. Reverse DCF implies ~8–9% FCF growth vs management algorithm of 15% EPS. Base case ~$280 over 5yrs. Q2 print risk is live. Score moves inversely with price.

0–39 Poor 40–59 Weak 60–74 Average 75–89 Strong 90–100 Exceptional

One-line thesis: Own the world's highest-ROIC toll booth on global travel — a payments-and-data flywheel compounding FCF/share at ~21% over three years, bought at 15x FCF while the market prices in half the growth management has already delivered.

Part 1

Business Overview

1.1Business Model

World's largest online travel agency by gross bookings. Five brands: Booking.com (~90% of value; 4.4M properties, 220+ countries, 40+ languages), Priceline (US value brand, Penny AI), Agoda (Asia specialist), KAYAK (metasearch), OpenTable (60,000+ restaurants).
Pure marketplace — owns no hotels, planes, or physical assets. A digital toll booth: traveler searches, books, pays; Booking earns ~15% commission or processes as merchant of record.
~87% gross margin. Essentially no cost of goods sold.
Three revenue lines. Merchant (Booking.com processes payment): now 70% of gross bookings, up from 63% in 2024. Agency (traditional post-stay commission): declining share. Advertising and other (KAYAK, OpenTable, sponsored listings).
Revenue/GBV 14.5% (FY25), up from 14.3% (FY24) — payments revenue is a structural take-rate tailwind.
The flywheel: more supply → more travelers → more data → better search/personalization → more supply. Properties grew 63% from 2.7M (2022) to 4.4M (2025).

SourceBKNG-DOSSIER.md §1 · 10k 2025.pdf ^{[1] [3]}

1.2Revenue Sources

Metric	Q1 2025	Q1 2026	YoY
Room nights	~319M	338M	+6% (+8% ex-conflict)
Gross bookings	~$46.8B	$53.8B	+15% (+8% cc)
Revenue	$4,762M	$5,532M	+16% (+10% cc)
Adj EBITDA	~$1.1B	~$1.3B	+19%
Adj EPS (post-split)	~$1.00	$1.14	+14%
Operating cash flow	$3,283M	$3,215M	-2% (timing — see note)
Free cash flow	~$3.2B	~$3.1B	-2% (optical)
Diluted shares	827M	794M	-4%

FY scale (FY2025)	Value	YoY
Room nights	1.2B+	+8%
Gross bookings	$186B	+12%
Revenue	$26.9B	+13%
Airline tickets	68M	+37%
Rental car days	88M	—
Attraction tickets growth	~80% YoY	—
Total listings	32M	—

FCF optics — read carefully BKNG holds travelers' money in deferred merchant bookings between booking and check-in. Q1 is always large, Q4 always small. Q1 2026 FCF down 2% YoY despite EBITDA up 19% because: (1) $100M less deferred-bookings build from March cancellations (Middle East), (2) $333M unrealized equity gain on Trip.com/Grab stakes hits NI but is subtracted from cash, (3) lower non-cash adjustments. Read adj EBITDA (+19%) for underlying cash power.

SourceBKNG-DOSSIER.md §2 · 10Q 28.04.2026.pdf ^{[1] [4]}

1.3Key Performance Indicators

1.2B+ room nights/yr generating the most reviews, pricing data, and booking history of any platform.
4.4M properties on Booking.com, up from 2.7M in 2022 (+63%). Top 10 hotel chains only low double-digit % of room nights — the rest is independent properties that need Booking to exist commercially.
Merchant mix 70% of gross bookings, up from 63% in 2024 and ~45% a few years ago. $130B merchant volume FY25.
Genius loyalty: 30%+ of active travelers are Genius L2 or L3; ~mid-50%+ of room nights from Genius members. 850,000+ participating properties.
Connected Trip transactions: high-teens growth Q1 2026, ~3x total B.com transaction growth. Penetration low-double-digit % and rising.
US room nights low-teens growth Q1 2026 — fourth consecutive quarter of acceleration.
Q1 2026 buyback $3.6B — largest quarterly buyback in company history. Bought into a guidance cut and a geopolitical dip.
Average buyback price since 2014: ~$93 post-split vs current ~$168–172. Fogel has been right across cycles.
Quarterly dividend (post-split) $0.42, annual run rate ~$1.57/share, payout ratio ~14% of FCF/share.

SourceBKNG-DOSSIER.md §5 & §8 ^[1]

Part 2

Moat

2.1Industry Overview & Growth

OTA category is mature in Europe (~50% of room nights) and accelerating in the US (low-teens Q1 2026, after four quarters of acceleration). Asia growing low-double-digits (~25% of room nights).
Long-term algorithm reaffirmed verbatim every call: 8%+ cc GBV growth, 8%+ cc revenue growth, 15%+ cc adj EPS growth. Reaffirmed every quarter from Q4 2024 through Q1 2026.
AI disruption risk is the central long-term question. Fogel's defense (regulatory complexity, payments, property onboarding, data) is the most specific in the industry. Early evidence: OpenAI chose Booking.com as App Store partner; Anthropic's Claude advertises with Booking; Penny supports direct accommodation+flight booking inside an AI flow — competitors cannot match this fulfilment step.
Transformation Program $550M run-rate annual savings by Q4 2025 (vs original $400–450M target). Customer service costs DOWN in absolute terms despite +10% bookings.
Regulatory complexity is a moat. Fogel listed DSA, DMA, DFA, EU AIA, P2B, DAC 7 by acronym on the Q4 2025 call — barriers to AI-native challengers.

SourceBKNG-DOSSIER.md §3 · CORRECTED-TRANSCRIPT_-BKNG-Q4-2025.pdf ^{[1] [6]}

2.2Qualitative Competitor Analysis

Expedia Group (NASDAQ: EXPE)Tier 1

Largest public OTA peer. Brand portfolio (Expedia, Hotels.com, Vrbo) but materially smaller property network and weaker take-rate trajectory. Has not matched BKNG's merchant-of-record shift at the same pace.

Airbnb (NASDAQ: ABNB)Adjacent

Alternative accommodation specialist. Different supply pool (private listings) so partly complementary; Booking.com competes via its own alternative-accom inventory. Limited overlap in core hotel market.

Trip.com Group (NASDAQ: TCOM)Regional

Asia leader; Booking holds an equity stake. Strong in China and surrounding markets. Booking's Agoda competes directly in Asia outside China.

Google Travel + AI agents (ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini)AI tail risk

The disintermediation thesis. Fogel: “Google would have taken this over long ago if it were easy.” Counter-evidence: OpenAI chose Booking.com as App Store partner, Claude advertises with Booking, Penny direct-books inside AI conversations. Status — AI is top-of-funnel acquisition, not merchant of record.

SourceBKNG-DOSSIER.md §3 & §6 ^[1]

2.3Moat Analysis

Moat type	Strength	Evidence
Network effects (supply)	Strong	4.4M properties because that is where the travelers are. Independent properties cannot build their own global distribution.
Network effects (demand)	Strong	1.2B room nights/yr generates the most reviews, pricing data, and booking history of any platform; data not shared with competitors.
Switching costs (Genius)	Strong	30%+ of active travelers Genius L2/L3; tiered discounts + breakfast + upgrades across 850K properties; switching resets status — real lock-in.
Payments infrastructure	Strong	100+ payment methods, 50+ currencies, $130B merchant volume FY25. Fogel: would not be easily replicated by largest AI companies.
Regulatory complexity	Strong	DSA, DMA, DFA, EU AIA, P2B, DAC 7 plus 200+ national regulators; thousand+ partner-services staff required daily.
Brand	Medium (US weak)	Dominant in Europe; US brand awareness explicitly acknowledged as weaker — though now translating into low-teens room night growth as that gap closes.

SourceBKNG-DOSSIER.md §1 & §5 · CORRECTED-TRANSCRIPT_-BKNG-Q1-2026.pdf ^{[1] [5]}

2.4Additional Moat Considerations

Selected from the 26-item framework. Items shown are the strongest supporting points and the most material concerns for Booking specifically.

YesHighest ROIC in universe47% ROIC; 3yr ROIIC 180%; ROCE 81%

YesAsset-light marketplace~87% gross margin; owns no hotels, planes, or physical assets

YesTwo-sided network4.4M properties ↔ 1.2B room nights; supply and demand produce each other

YesFounder-class capital allocatorFogel 25yrs, $92.4M personal stake, $3.6B record Q1 buyback into guidance cut

YesBuyback discipline~$29B since 2022 (22% net float reduction); avg price $93 vs current $168–172

YesTake-rate tailwindRevenue/GBV 14.3% → 14.5% on payments mix; merchant 70% of bookings

YesUnderpromise / overdeliverBeat high end of room-night guidance every quarter from Q1 2024 to Q4 2025

YesGenAI reducing cost not just hypeCustomer service costs DOWN absolute despite +10% bookings; Agoda cost/booking -double-digit YoY

ModRoom night growth normalising+17% (FY23) → +9% (FY24) → +8% (FY25) → +6% Q1 2026 (conflict)

ModEuropean concentration~50% of room nights from Europe

ModConnected Trip deceleration>50% → 45% → 35% → mid-20% → high-teens not flagged by mgmt

NoMiddle East conflict near-termQ2 2026 room nights +2–4%; FY guide assumes ~4-month impact then recovery

NoCEO succession undisclosedFogel 64; “formal succession planning exists” but no public details

SourceBKNG-DOSSIER.md §5 & §6 · Meta analysis from poorcharlie.io.txt (framework) ^{[1] [8]}

Part 3

Management

3.1Leadership & Tenure

Glenn Fogel — President & CEO. Age 64. At Booking Holdings since 2000 (25 years); CEO since 2017.
Ewout Steenbergen — EVP & CFO since March 2024 (joined from S&P Global). Age 56.
CEO stake (2024 proxy): Fogel beneficially owns 17,822 shares (pre-split) = $64.66M at the $3,627.88 closing price on Mar 28, 2024. Holding meets stock ownership guideline (15,000 shares or $5M) by >12x.
Other NEO stakes (2024 proxy, Mar 31, 2024): Peter Millones (General Counsel) 12,445 shares = $45.15M; Paulo Pisano (CHRO) 914 shares = $3.32M and 227 vested options; Ewout Steenbergen (CFO, joined Mar 15, 2024) 0 shares — under transition allowance.
All directors and executive officers as a group (15 persons): 40,790 shares = less than 1% of 34,066,419 shares outstanding. No 5% insider holders; top external 5% holders are Vanguard 8.6%, BlackRock 7.6%, Capital World Investors 5.1%.
Equity comp structure: NEO long-term incentive mix in 2024 reset to 60% PSUs / 40% RSUs; PSUs use a three-year cliff vest, three-year financial targets, rTSR modifier (±25%), and an absolute TSR governor that caps payout at target if absolute TSR is not positive.
Governance teeth: hedging, pledging, short-selling and margin trading of Booking stock are prohibited for executives and directors; stock-option repricing requires stockholder approval; clawback policy covers both incentive-based comp and financial restatements.
Operational philosophy: “No silver bullets, just blocking and tackling, day by day” (Q3 2025) — used near-verbatim across every call. Antithesis of moonshot management.
Gain share in downturns: stated Q1 2025 and reaffirmed Q1 2026: “We have always, in the past, used those opportunities to gain share.” The Q1 2026 record $3.6B buyback is the execution.
SBC $615M/yr, 6.8% of FCF — low by tech comparison. Share count -5.6%/yr; net float shrinker.

SourceBKNG-DOSSIER.md §3 · 2024-proxy-statement-and-annual-report.pdf · Notice of Annual Stockholders 2026.pdf ^{[1] [7] [13]}

3.2M&A History

Year	Target	Strategic role	Outcome
2005	Booking.com	European hotel-OTA platform — the foundational asset	Now ~90% of company value
2007	Agoda	Asia-Pacific OTA	Operational localisation per market; growing well
2013	KAYAK ($1.8B)	Metasearch & comparison	Integrated; supports demand-side discovery
2014	OpenTable ($2.6B)	Restaurant reservations	60,000+ restaurants; cross-sell into trip
2024	Etraveli flight-booking (attempted)	Flight aggregator	Blocked by EU; pivot to organic flight growth instead (68M tickets FY25, +37%)

Track record Acquisitions historically integrated cleanly. The Etraveli block is a positive in hindsight — organic flight build delivered 68M tickets at +37% growth in FY25 without integration risk or goodwill. Recent capital allocation has been overwhelmingly via buybacks ($29B since 2022, 86% of total returns), not M&A.

SourceBKNG-DOSSIER.md §3 ^[1]

3.3Said vs Delivered

Promise	When	Outcome	Consistent?
LT algorithm 8% GBV / 8% rev / 15% EPS (cc)	Q4 24 onward	FY24: GBV +11% cc, EPS +24%. FY25: GBV +13%, rev +13%, EPS +22%	Beat all 3 targets
Room nights will beat high end of guidance	Q1 24–Q4 25	Beat high end of guidance every quarter tracked, typically by 3–5pp	Yes, every quarter
Transformation Program $400–450M annual run-rate savings	Q4 24	Target raised to $500–550M; $550M achieved by Q4 25	Over-delivered
Customer service costs down with GenAI	Q1 24 & Q3 25	Costs DOWN absolute despite +10% bookings; Agoda -double-digit cost/booking YoY	Yes
AI: LLMs stay top-of-funnel; not merchant of record	Q3/Q4 25	OpenAI App Store partner, Claude live ad, Penny direct-books in flow	Early validation
$29B+ buybacks since 2022; share count keeps falling	Ongoing	Share count 37.6M (2022) → 31.7M (FY25) → 774M post-split = 22% net reduction over 3.5yrs	Accelerating
Middle East conflict is transient	Q1 26 (Apr 26)	High end of FY26 guide unchanged; Q2 guide assumes full-quarter impact then H2 recovery	Pending H2 26
Connected Trip high-20% txn growth, accelerating	Q4 25	Q1 26: high-teens. Decel from 45% (Q4 24) → 35% → mid-20% → high-teens never flagged	Selective framing

Verdict Fogel and Steenbergen say what they do and do what they say across 8 consecutive calls. One genuine intellectual-honesty marker: Connected Trip transaction-growth deceleration is real and unflagged by management even while penetration rises. Not a crisis — absolute base is larger — but worth noting.

SourceBKNG-DOSSIER.md §4 · BKNG-Q1-2026-Earnings-Call-Detailed-Notes.md ^{[1] [9]}

Part 4

Key Ratios

4.1Growth Rates

Metric	1Y	3Y CAGR	5Y CAGR	10Y CAGR
FCF Growth (Per Share) %	11.10%	21.70%	0%	0%
Revenue Growth (Per Share) %	19.80%	24.60%	38%	14.90%
EPS without NRI Growth %	19.10%	27.70%	96.20%	11.50%

Standout — Revenue per share 5Y CAGR 38% Revenue/share 5Y CAGR of 38% is exceptional even allowing for the Covid-distorted FY2020 base; the 1Y of 19.80% and 3Y of 24.60% show the post-Covid take-rate and supply expansion are still compounding.

Watch — 10Y EPS CAGR only 11.50% Despite recent acceleration, the 10Y EPS CAGR of 11.50% shows the large-base drag on a $130B-cap business; FCF 5Y CAGR reading 0% is a Covid optical artifact, not a true stall.

SourcePortfolio snapshot 30.05.2026.txt (GuruFocus export) ^[14]

4.2Margins

Metric	Current	5Y Growth Rate	5Y Median
Gross Margin %	n/a	n/a	N/A
Operating Margin %	34.28%	25.30%	29.85%
FCF Margin %	32.63%	N/A	33.25%

Standout — Operating margin 34.28% above 5Y median Operating margin of 34.28% sits in the "elite" band (>30%) and well above its 5Y median of 29.85%; the 5Y growth rate of +25.30% confirms the take-rate tailwind (Revenue/GBV 14.3% → 14.5%) is flowing through to operating leverage.

SourcePortfolio snapshot 30.05.2026.txt ^[14]

4.3Capital Efficiency

Metric	Current	5Y Median
ROIC %	47.30%	36.81%
ROCE %	81.14%	45.72%
ROE %	Negative Equity	68.26%
Cash Conversion Ratio	1.47	1.68

ROIIC % (Return on Incremental Invested Capital)

Period	ROIIC %
1-Year	35.80%
3-Year	180.53%
5-Year	229.42%

Note — Negative Equity Repeated aggressive buybacks have driven book equity negative, which makes traditional ROE and Debt-to-Equity meaningless. ROIC, ROCE and ROIIC remain the right return-on-capital lenses here.

Standout — ROIIC 5Y 229.42% best-in-class ROIC of 47.30% (vs 5Y median 36.81%) and ROCE of 81.14% (vs 5Y median 45.72%) are both elite-tier, and the 5Y ROIIC of 229.42% is the highest in the watchlist; this is what a working two-sided network looks like at scale.

SourcePortfolio snapshot 30.05.2026.txt ^[14]

4.4Balance Sheet Health

Metric	Current
Debt-to-Equity	-2.17 (neg equity)
Cash-to-Debt	0.85
Interest Coverage	7.77
Current Ratio	1.06

Watch — Cash-to-Debt 0.85 and IC 7.77 Cash-to-Debt of 0.85 is below the >1 net-cash line and interest coverage of 7.77 sits in the "OK" (5–20) band rather than the safe >20 band — consistent with the debt-financed buyback policy that produced the negative equity above.

SourcePortfolio snapshot 30.05.2026.txt ^[14]

4.5Shareholder Returns & Other Metrics

Metric	Current
1-Year Dividend Growth Rate (Per Share) %	N/A
3-Year Dividend Growth Rate (Per Share) %	N/A
Dividends per Share (TTM)	$1.57
1-Year Share Buyback Ratio	N/A
3-Year Share Buyback Ratio	5.60
5-Year Share Buyback Ratio	5.60
Goodwill-to-Asset %	0.10
Stock Based Compensation (mm)	$615M
Free Cash Flow (mm)	$9,033M

Standout — 5Y buyback ratio 5.60% Shrinking the float by 5.60% per year over five years is aggressive even by mega-cap standards and is the mechanical driver of EPS outrunning revenue; SBC at $615M is just 6.8% of $9,033M FCF, well inside the "normal" band.

Standout — Goodwill-to-Asset 0.10 Goodwill at only 10% of assets confirms BKNG is an organic compounder, not an acquisition story — well below the 0.40 acquisition-heavy line and a clean contrast to peers like ADBE at 0.43.

SourcePortfolio snapshot 30.05.2026.txt ^[14]

Part 5

Valuation

5.1Current Multiples vs 10-Year Context

Multiple	Current	10yr median	Read
P / FCF	14.9x	19.8x	Below 10yr median for a 47% ROIC business
EV / FCF	14.7x	—	Net debt modest vs earnings
EV / EBIT	14.7x	—	Low for elite operating margin
P / E (no NRI)	19.1x	—	Reasonable for the quality and growth
FCF Yield	6.96%	—	Low end of historical multiples

SourceBKNG-DOSSIER.md §8 · BKNG-Financials-Snapshot-2026-05-01.md ^{[1] [11]}

5.2Reverse DCF — What the Market Prices In

Two-stage model, 10% discount rate, 20-year horizon. Current price ~$168–172; FCF/share TTM ~$11.60 (775M shares post-split).

Stage	Growth assumption	Terminal	Implied value
Growth stage (yrs 1–10)	8–9%	—	—
Terminal stage (yrs 11+)	—	3%	—
Market-implied price	—	—	~$168–172

What this means The market is pricing ~8–9% FCF/share growth for a decade. Management is delivering 21.7% on a 3-year basis and guiding the long-term algorithm at 15%+ EPS growth. The market is pricing less than half the growth rate management has consistently delivered and explicitly targets.

SourceBKNG-DOSSIER.md §8 ^[1]

5.3DCF Scenarios

Scenario	Growth assumption	Exit multiple	Approx 5yr price	vs ~$168
Market implied	8–9%	15x	~$168–172	—
Bear (conflict extends, growth slows)	5–8%	12x	~$155–200	essentially flat
Base (LT algorithm; H2 recovery)	15% EPS, 8–12% FCF	16–18x	~$280–330	+65–90%
Bull (US continues low-teens; AI additive)	18–20%	20x	~$400–460	+135–170%

Asymmetry / conclusion Bear case barely loses money; base case roughly doubles; bull case triples. Exceptional asymmetry for an investment-grade-rated business with a $9B FCF run rate. The base case requires only the long-term algorithm management has consistently delivered — not heroic assumptions.

SourceBKNG-DOSSIER.md §8 ^[1]

Part 6

Risks

6.1Red flags, ranked by severity

Middle East conflict duration uncertainSeverity: medium (live near-term). FY guide assumes ~4 months direct/indirect impact (through end of Q2 2026) then H2 recovery. If conflict extends into H2 or escalates to global energy/jet-fuel disruption, the FY2026 guide moves down. Q2 will print weakly regardless (room nights +2–4%); the question is whether the H2 recovery materialises.
Room night growth normalizingSeverity: medium. Volume trajectory: +17% FY2023 → +9% FY2024 → +8% FY2025 → +6% Q1 2026 (conflict-affected). Long-term algorithm anchors at 8%+ GBV growth; flights (+28%), attractions (+25%), Connected Trip filling the gap. Raw room-night deceleration is a real trend worth tracking — 6 consecutive quarters of slowing.
Dividend direction watchSeverity: medium. Initiated Jan 2024 at $0.35/qtr post-split, raised to $0.42/qtr Feb 2026 (+20%). Payout ratio ~14% of FCF. Fogel has never publicly explained why a dividend was started after 15+ years of buyback-only returns. At 14% payout, does not impair capital allocation; concern is directional. If trends above 20–25% of FCF it starts competing with the buyback program.
CEO succession undisclosedSeverity: medium. Fogel is 64, CEO since 2017; proxy confirms “formal succession planning” exists but no public details. Fogel's capital allocation discipline — record buyback into a guidance cut — is person-specific. When he exits, that premium is at risk. 5+ year watch item; determines whether the buy-hold-forever framing survives the next transition.
European concentrationSeverity: medium. ~50% of room nights originate from Europe. A genuine European recession (as opposed to the perpetual “slow growth”) would be felt asymmetrically. Mitigated by Asia growing low-double-digits (25% of room nights) and US accelerating to low-teens.
Connected Trip deceleration not acknowledgedSeverity: medium. Transaction growth trajectory: >50% Q1 2024 → 45% → 35% → mid-20% → high-20% → high-teens Q1 2026. Management always frames positively and never flags the deceleration. Not a crisis — absolute base is larger and Connected transactions still 3x total B.com transaction growth — but the selective framing is an intellectual-honesty marker.
AI disruption (long-term tail risk, well-defended)Severity: low. Risk: AI agents (ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini) disintermediate OTAs by booking travel directly. Fogel's defense (regulatory complexity, payment methods, property-onboarding infrastructure, data moat) is the most specific in the industry. Early evidence supports him: OpenAI chose Booking.com as App Store partner; Anthropic's Claude advertises with Booking.com; Penny direct booking inside an AI conversation is the first concrete counter-evidence.

SourceBKNG-DOSSIER.md §6 ^[1]

Verdict

Active — hold; willing to add a second tranche if Q2 print drives further weakness

Stance: Active — hold; willing to add a second tranche if Q2 print drives further weakness. ~14.9x FCF with the market pricing ~8–9% FCF/share growth vs 3-year actual 21.7%. Base case (LT algorithm; H2 recovery) implies +65–90% over 5 years.
Add zone: $155–165 (~13–14x TTM FCF) for a second tranche to bring position from 3.8% toward 5–6% of portfolio.
Trim trigger: Middle East impact extending into Q3 / H2 without recovery language, OR US room night growth decelerating below high-single-digits, OR new CEO with weaker capital-allocation discipline.
Watching: Q2 2026 earnings (late Jul) — H2 recovery language is the key signal; US room night growth sustaining low-teens; Connected Trip + Genius combined launch flagged for 2026; buyback pace ($3B+ continuation); dividend payout ratio (under 20%); Penny direct-booking volume disclosure.
Next review: Q2 2026 earnings — expected late July 2026.

Last reviewed May 25, 2026 after Q1 2026 results · Next review late July 2026 (Q2 2026)

References

Where every claim came from

[1]Company information/Booking/BKNG-DOSSIER.mdLiving research-report source file, last updated 2026-05-25. Primary reference for all qualitative and quantitative content unless otherwise noted.
[2]Company information/Booking/BKNG-earnings-analysis-FY2025.mdInternal FY2025 earnings analysis with line-item commentary.
[3]Company information/Booking/10k 2025.pdfFY2025 Form 10-K — primary source for business model, segment disclosure, and FY2025 financials.
[4]Company information/Booking/10Q 28.04.2026.pdfQ1 2026 Form 10-Q, filed 28 April 2026 — primary source for Q1 2026 financials.
[5]Company information/Booking/CORRECTED-TRANSCRIPT_-Booking-Holdings-Inc-BKNG-US-Q1-2026-Earnings-Call-28-April-2026-4_30-PM-ET.pdfQ1 2026 earnings call transcript — primary source for Middle East conflict framing, record buyback, AI defense, Penny direct booking.
[6]Company information/Booking/CORRECTED-TRANSCRIPT_-Booking-Holdings-Inc-BKNG-US-Q4-2025-Earnings-Call-18-February-2026-4_30-PM-ET.pdfQ4 2025 earnings call transcript — primary source for FY25 long-term algorithm, EU regulatory acronyms, US brand commentary.
[7]Company information/Booking/Notice of Annual Stockholders 2026.pdf2026 proxy statement — primary source for Fogel's $92.4M personal stake and succession-planning disclosure.
[8]Stock portfolio/Meta analysis from poorcharlie.io.txtScoring framework and 26-item additional-moat checklist; used for the structure of Part 2.4 only, not for Booking-specific content.
[9]Company information/Booking/BKNG-Q1-2026-Earnings-Call-Detailed-Notes.md & BKNG-Q1-2026-Thesis-Update.mdInternal Q1 2026 call notes and thesis update.
[10]Company information/Booking/BKNG-FCF-Progression-Analysis.mdFCF/share progression analysis including the 3yr vs 5yr CAGR explanation.
[11]Company information/Booking/BKNG-Financials-Snapshot-2026-05-01.mdFinancials snapshot pulled 2026-05-01 — primary source for multiples, ROIC, ROCE, GF Score.
[12]Company information/Booking/Investor-Presentation-February-2026-_v-Final.pdfFebruary 2026 investor presentation referenced for the LT algorithm framing.
[13]Company information/Booking/2024-proxy-statement-and-annual-report.pdf2024 proxy statement — primary source for the Mar 31, 2024 ownership table (Fogel 17,822 shares = $64.66M, NEO holdings, group total 40,790 shares = <1%) and the 60%/40% PSU/RSU NEO equity mix with three-year cliff vesting.
[14]Portfolio snapshot 30.05.2026.txtGuruFocus portfolio snapshot exported 2026-05-30; primary source for Part 4 ratios.

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