Copart Inc (CPRT) — PoorCharlie Research Report

Price N/A live quote

Market cap $30,339M ~965M diluted shares (-~1.3% YoY after 43.4M buyback)

Enterprise value N/A Net cash ~$4.2B (cash + HTM)

Overall score 79 Strong · out of 100

Score breakdown

79/100

Strong

Moat

19/20

Two-sided network with owned land (250+ lots), Title Express at 5–8x next competitor, ~1M global buyers in 185+ countries, two-decade online-only head start, network effect strengthening. The strongest pillar.

Management

17/20

Liaw + Stearns have delivered on every operational metric telegraphed (ASPs, FCF, international margins). $1.63B buybacks YTD on a stock they believe is below intrinsic value is conviction action, not narrative.

Business risk

14/20

Insurance unit volume -2.7% YoY (cyclical, healing from -9% in Q2); 81–83% seller concentration in insurance; international margin lag. Offsets: zero debt, $4.2B cash, structural TLF tailwind.

Key ratios

18/20

ROIC ~26%, 3yr ROIIC 43%, 10yr FCF CAGR 23.3%, gross margin 46.3%, US OM 38.1%, SBC ~2.3% of FCF. Owner earnings ≈ reported FCF. ~4.6% FCF yield at snapshot. -2 because TTM revenue is flat and 3yr FCF CAGR is in a 13.1% trough.

Valuation

11/20

~22.7x P/FCF on snapshot. Market is implying ~14–15% growth — well below the 5yr CAGR but above the cyclical-trough 3yr CAGR. Bear (13%) = -15%. Base (20%) = +39%. Bull (23%) = +70%. Score moves inversely with price.

0–39 Poor 40–59 Weak 60–74 Average 75–89 Strong 90–100 Exceptional

One-line thesis: Own the world's dominant online salvage auction marketplace — a two-sided physical-plus-digital network with owned-land moats and a structural total-loss-frequency tailwind — and wait for the cyclical insurance pullback to fully reverse.

Part 1

Business Overview

1.1Business Model

World's largest online auction marketplace for salvage and total-loss vehicles. Two-sided B2B platform: insurance sellers on one side, ~1M global dealer/dismantler/rebuilder buyers in 185+ countries on the other.
Online-only since 2003 — nearly a two-decade head start over all competitors. Proprietary auction platform: VB3 (Virtual Bidding Third Generation).
Earns fees on both sides of the transaction: a service fee from the seller (primarily the PIP model — a percentage of the final auction price) and buyer fees on top of the sale price.
Owns 250+ storage lots across the US and internationally. Owned land with irreplaceable zoning is the physical anchor of the moat.
Title Express is Copart's in-house title processing platform — processing volume 5–8x larger than any competitor. Cuts insurer cycle times by up to 10 days.
Adjacent businesses: BluCar (fleet/rental/corporate consignment), Purple Wave (heavy equipment auction; GTV +25% LTM), Copart Delivered (long-haul logistics, launched ~12 months before Q3 FY2026).
The structural engine is Total-Loss Frequency (TLF): the share of accidents declared total losses. TLF was 15.6% in 2015 and reached 23.6% in Q1 CY2026, peaking at 24.2% in Q4 CY2025.

SourceCPRT-DOSSIER.md §1 · 10K 2025.pdf ^{[1] [2]}

1.2Revenue Sources

Metric	Q3 FY2026	Q3 FY2025	Change
Total revenue	$1.237B	$1.212B	+2.1%
Service revenue	$1.056B	$1.035B	+2.1%
Global gross profit	$572.6M	$552.3M	+3.7%
Global gross margin	46.3%	45.6%	+71 bps
Operating income	$464.3M	$451.5M	+2.8%
Net income	$402.4M	$406.6M	-1.0%
Diluted EPS	$0.43	$0.42	+2.4%

Seller mix (FY2025)	% of seller volume	Geography	% of revenue
Insurance companies	~81–83%	United States	~77%
Dealers, fleet/rental, finance, charities	~17–19%	International (Germany + UK lead)	~23%

Notes Q3 FY2026 unit picture: global insurance units -2.7% YoY (ex-CAT: -1.9%). US insurance -4.2% (ex-CAT: -3.0%). International units +5.9% (insurance +4.6%; non-insurance +11.2%). US insurance ASPs +4.1% — all-time seasonal record. International OM hit 31.5%, +270 bps YoY.

SourceCPRT-DOSSIER.md §2 · cprt-04-30-26-earnings-release.pdf ^{[1] [3]}

1.3Key Performance Indicators

TLF reached 23.6% in Q1 CY2026, up from 15.6% in 2015. Q4 CY2025 was the peak at 24.2%.
~1M global buyer members in 185+ countries. 30,000+ crossover buyers (whole-car → insurance) over 3 years; majority bid on insurance inventory within 90 days of first engagement.
US insurance ASPs +4.1% in Q3 FY2026 — all-time seasonal record despite unit volume softness.
Pure-sale share of insurance units at all-time highs. Liaw: pure-sale share “literally an order of magnitude higher” than competing platforms.
International OM 31.5% (+270 bps YoY); international revenue +14.1%.
YTD share buybacks $1.63B — 43.4M shares retired (~4.5% of float).
FCF +12% YTD at Q3 on flat revenue. +58% YTD at H1.
Purple Wave GTV +25% LTM. Team 2.5–3x acquisition size; expanding to coasts.
SBC $29M YTD (~$39M annualised) on ~$1.7B annualised FCF — ~2.3% of FCF.

SourceCPRT-DOSSIER.md §5 & §7 · Q3 2026.md ^{[1] [4]}

Part 2

Moat

2.1Industry Overview & Growth

TLF is structural, not cyclical. Rising vehicle complexity (ADAS sensors, aluminum bodies, EV batteries), higher repair labour costs, and Copart's own auction returns making total-loss economics superior to repair for insurers.
EVs as accelerant. EVs total-loss more frequently than ICE vehicles because battery replacement costs often exceed vehicle value. Copart is already the world's largest EV reseller.
Virtuous circle. Higher auction returns → total-loss pathway is cheaper for insurers than repairs → TLF rises → more supply for Copart → larger buyer network → higher returns → repeat. Management explicitly frames driving TLF higher as a strategic responsibility.
Non-insurance / whole-car TAM: 15M+ auction-mediated vehicles in the US alone. Fleet, rental, dealer, finance segments growing double-digit.
International expansion. Germany and UK are the largest non-US markets; new markets include India, Bahrain, Oman, UAE. Each requires up-front land and lot investment before meaningful volume.

SourceCPRT-DOSSIER.md §1 & §5 ^[1]

2.2Qualitative Competitor Analysis

IAA (RB Global, NYSE:RBA)Tier 1

The duopoly partner. Acquired by Ritchie Bros / RB Global in 2023. Smaller global buyer base, less mature online platform, Title Express equivalent processing 5–8x smaller, fewer owned lots. Carries the structural disadvantages of a perpetual #2 in a network-effect business but remains the only credible peer at scale.

ACV Auctions (NASDAQ:ACVA)Adjacent

Wholesale dealer-to-dealer auctions, primarily off-lease and trade-in vehicles — not salvage. Different inventory pool. Tangential competitor; not a salvage auction substitute.

Purple Wave (Copart-owned)Subsidiary

Heavy equipment online auction. GTV +25% LTM as of Q3 FY2026. Team 2.5–3x acquisition size. Expanding territory into coastal markets and winning enterprise accounts. Extends the auction model into construction and agriculture.

Regional / niche operatorsNiche

Local salvage yards, small online platforms, junkyards. None operate at Copart's scale on lots, buyer network, title processing, or auction liquidity. No new entrant can replicate the model in under 10 years.

SourceCPRT-DOSSIER.md §1 & §5 ^[1]

2.3Moat Analysis

Moat type	Strength	Evidence
Network effects	Strong	~1M buyers in 185+ countries. Pure-sale share “an order of magnitude higher” than competitors (Liaw, Q3 FY2026). ASPs at records despite unit softness — deepest auction liquidity in the category.
Physical assets / land	Strong	250+ owned lots, irreplaceable zoning. 20/20/20 program (2016) executed; capacity now ahead of demand. Land acquisition takes years — new entrants cannot fast-follow.
Switching costs	Strong	Title Express integration with insurer systems. Carrier cycle times cut by up to 10 days. Switching forces operational disruption and re-integration.
Scale / process	Strong	Title Express processes 5–8x volume of next competitor. Two-decade online-only head start. AI tools (total-loss decision platform) deployed to carriers 2+ years.
Intangible assets	Medium	Brand recognition among global salvage buyers; not consumer-facing. Proprietary VB3 auction platform.
Regulatory	Mixed	International title/registration friction (Germany in particular) is a regulatory headwind for international expansion, not a domestic moat.

SourceCPRT-DOSSIER.md §1 & §5 · Q1-Q2 2026 Earnings Call Transcript ^{[1] [5]}

2.4Additional Moat Considerations

Selected from the 26-item framework. Items shown are the strongest supporting points and the most material concerns for Copart specifically.

YesTwo-sided network effect~1M buyers; more buyers → higher ASPs → more sellers consign → more inventory → repeat

YesMission-critical serviceInsurers depend on Copart to monetise total-loss vehicles; no comparable alternative at scale

YesStrong operating leverageFCF +12% YTD on flat revenue; variable-cost towing/processing falls faster than revenues in unit downturn

YesPricing powerPIP model: revenue scales with ASP, not just unit count; US insurance ASPs at all-time seasonal records

YesAsset advantage — owned land250+ lots with irreplaceable zoning; no fast-follow possible

YesStructural tailwindTLF rising decade-long: 15.6% (2015) → 23.6% (Q1 CY2026)

YesHigh ROIIC3yr ROIIC 43% — one of the best capital-allocation records in the universe

YesWin-win ecosystemHigher Copart returns → insurers prefer total-loss → TLF rises → Copart wins again

ModConcentration risk~81–83% seller volume from insurance carriers; non-insurance expansion directly addresses this

ModCyclical sensitivityConsumer pullback on auto insurance drives unit volume; -2.7% in Q3 (healing from -9% in Q2)

ModAI disruption riskLiaw: Copart is the AI deployer for insurance carriers, not the disrupted party

NoInternational margin parityInternational OM 31.5% vs US 38.1%; multi-year path to convergence; regulatory friction in Germany

SourceCPRT-DOSSIER.md §5 & §6 · Meta analysis from poorcharlie.io.txt (framework) ^{[1] [8]}

Part 3

Management

3.1Leadership & Tenure

Jeff Liaw — CEO. Long tenure in senior roles at Copart. Signs the FY2025 10-K as principal executive officer.
Leah Stearns — CFO. Signs the FY2025 10-K as principal financial and accounting officer.
Founders / long-tenured directors on the board: Willis J. Johnson (founder) and A. Jayson Adair (former CEO, now director) both signed the FY2025 10-K as directors alongside Liaw (Executive Chairman) and Stearns (Director). Founder/operator continuity preserved at board level.
Item 12 ownership table: incorporated by reference from the forthcoming proxy statement (not yet in our local Copart folder). Specific CEO/CFO/founder share counts, % ownership, and "directors and executive officers as a group" totals therefore not in the 10-K itself.
Equity comp scale: total stock-based compensation FY2025 $38.0M (G&A $29.9M + facility ops $8.1M) plus $2.3M Purple Wave plan; awards granted under the 2007 Equity Incentive Plan as RSUs, RSAs, PSUs and options. SBC is roughly 2.3% of FCF — low for the sector.
Governance: formal insider-trading policy filed as Exhibit 19.1 to the 10-K, governing director/officer/employee transactions in Copart securities.
Messaging across Q1–Q3 FY2026 is strikingly consistent: long-term growth algorithm intact, carrier pullback is cyclical, Copart drives TLF rather than passively benefits, record ASPs are proof of marketplace depth, buybacks reflect conviction.
Specific NEO share counts and % insider ownership pending the next proxy filing in the local folder.

SourceCPRT-DOSSIER.md §3 · 10K 2025.pdf (Item 10, Item 12 reference, signatures, SBC note) · Q1-Q2 2026 Earnings Call Transcript ^{[1] [2] [5]}

3.2M&A History

Year / Period	Target / Initiative	Strategic role	Outcome
2016	20/20/20 land program	Multi-year owned-lot expansion	Capacity now ahead of demand
~2019	Purple Wave (heavy equipment)	Adjacent online auction vertical	GTV +25% LTM at Q3 FY2026; team 2.5–3x acquisition size
Ongoing	International expansion (Germany, UK, India, Bahrain, Oman, UAE)	Geographic diversification + buyer-network deepening	International OM 31.5% in Q3; revenue +14.1%
Multi-year	BluCar	Fleet / rental / corporate seller channel	Growing 4%+ in Q3; expanding non-insurance volume
~2024	Copart Delivered (long-haul logistics)	Buyer-friction reduction + margin add	Rapid adoption; margin contributor
2024–present	Title Express investment	Switching-cost moat extension	5–8x competitor volume; cycle-time cut up to 10 days
FY2026 YTD	$1.63B share buyback (43.4M shares)	Capital return; conviction signal	Largest repurchase program in modern Copart history

Track record Copart historically grew organically rather than through large M&A. Purple Wave and Title Express are the standout adjacent build-outs; both are now contributing materially. The shift to large buybacks at the cyclical trough is itself an act of capital allocation: deploying ~$1.6B at depressed prices is the kind of move that defines a decade.

SourceCPRT-DOSSIER.md §3 & §5 ^[1]

3.3Said vs Delivered

Promise	When	Outcome	Consistent?
Unit softness cyclical; long-term algorithm intact	Q1 FY2026 (Nov 2025)	Q3 FY2026: insurance units -2.7% (improving from -9% in Q2); moderation in carrier trends observed	Yes — tracking
ASPs will reflect marketplace depth, not volume	Q1 FY2026	Q2: US insurance ASPs +9% ex-CAT; Q3: +4.1%, all-time seasonal record	Over-delivered
FCF will grow even with revenue headwinds	Q1 FY2026	FCF +58% YTD at H1; +12% YTD at Q3 (lower rate as capex normalised)	Delivered
Buybacks signal conviction	Q2 FY2026 (Feb 2026)	$500M in H1 → $1.63B by Q3 (43.4M shares, ~4.5% of float)	Significantly exceeded
International inflecting toward profitability	Q1/Q2 FY2026	International OM = 31.5% in Q3 (+270 bps YoY); revenue +14.1%	Delivered
AI being deployed to enhance returns for insurers	Q2 FY2026	Insurance Advisory Board meeting cited AI tools; total-loss decision tool running 2+ years	Consistent
Purple Wave expanding territory	Every period	GTV +25% LTM at Q3; team 2.5–3x acquisition size; expanding to coasts	Delivered
Consumer insurance pullback is cyclical	Multiple calls 2025–2026	1-in-6 policyholders pulling back per surveys; carriers seeing healthier income statements	Thesis intact; not yet visible in unit volumes

Verdict Management has delivered on every operational and financial metric it telegraphed — record ASPs, margin resilience, FCF growth, international profitability. The one outstanding item is insurance unit volume recovery; Q3's improvement to -2.7% (from -9% in Q2) is the first concrete evidence the trough is near.

SourceCPRT-DOSSIER.md §4 · Q1-Q2 2026 Earnings Call Transcript ^{[1] [5]}

Part 4

Key Ratios

4.1Growth Rates

Metric	1Y	3Y CAGR	5Y CAGR	10Y CAGR
FCF Growth (Per Share) %	38.40%	13.10%	26.80%	23.30%
Revenue Growth (Per Share) %	2.40%	9.40%	15.40%	16.40%
EPS without NRI Growth %	7.40%	12.60%	16%	21.30%

10Y FCF/share CAGR of 23.30% A decade of >20% per-share free cash flow compounding clears the exceptional bar and confirms the structural TLF tailwind has produced real, durable cash growth.

1Y revenue growth 2.40% vs 5Y CAGR 15.40% Sharp deceleration driven by the insurance-cycle slowdown; the question is whether 1Y is a cyclical dip or a new normal as TLF maturity reduces unit growth.

SourcePortfolio snapshot 30.05.2026.txt (GuruFocus export) ^[9]

4.2Margins

Metric	Current	5Y Growth Rate	5Y Median
Gross Margin %	45.34%	-1.10%	N/A
Operating Margin %	36.49%	-1.40%	38.42%
FCF Margin %	30.54%	N/A	22.70%

FCF margin 30.54% vs 5Y median 22.70% Cash margin is running roughly 780 bps above its own 5-year baseline and clears the elite >25% threshold — mix shift toward higher-ASP units and international leverage are showing up in the cash line.

Operating margin 36.49% vs 5Y median 38.42% Still elite-tier (>30%), but ~190 bps below the 5Y median; insurance-cycle volume softness is leaving operating leverage on the table even as FCF expands.

SourcePortfolio snapshot 30.05.2026.txt ^[9]

4.3Capital Efficiency

Metric	Current	5Y Median
ROIC %	28.61%	30.30%
ROCE %	18%	26.75%
ROE %	17.05%	23.32%
Cash Conversion Ratio	0.90	0.71

ROIIC % (Return on Incremental Invested Capital)

Period	ROIIC %
1-Year	43%
3-Year	22.13%
5-Year	31.74%

1Y ROIIC 43% with 5Y at 31.74% Incremental capital is earning a fresh 43% return after the cyclical dip, well above the >15% sustained-ideal bar — the cash hoard still has a high-return home in TLF density and international build-out.

ROIC 28.61% vs 5Y median 30.30% Still firmly in the elite >25% bracket, but ~170 bps of compression worth tracking; reflects the same insurance-cycle drag visible in margins and revenue growth.

SourcePortfolio snapshot 30.05.2026.txt ^[9]

4.4Balance Sheet Health

Metric	Current
Debt-to-Equity	0.01
Cash-to-Debt	53.07
Interest Coverage	N/A (no debt)
Current Ratio	10.06

Fortress balance sheet — Current Ratio 10.06, Cash/Debt 53.07 Current Ratio is 6.7x the >1.5 liquid benchmark and cash dwarfs debt by ~53x; effectively a net-cash, zero-leverage operator going into a cyclical trough.

SourcePortfolio snapshot 30.05.2026.txt ^[9]

4.5Shareholder Returns & Other Metrics

Metric	Current
1-Year Dividend Growth Rate (Per Share) %	N/A
3-Year Dividend Growth Rate (Per Share) %	N/A
Dividends per Share (TTM)	$0
1-Year Share Buyback Ratio	N/A
3-Year Share Buyback Ratio	-0.50
5-Year Share Buyback Ratio	-0.50
Goodwill-to-Asset %	0.05
Stock Based Compensation (mm)	$37.82M
Free Cash Flow (mm)	$1,408.85M

Goodwill-to-Asset 0.05 — organic compounder At 5% of assets, goodwill is a fraction of the >0.4 acquisition-heavy threshold; the moat is built, not bought, which keeps reinvestment economics clean.

5Y buyback ratio -0.50% with $37.82M SBC SBC equals ~2.7% of FCF (well under the <5% clean bar), but the float has crept up over five years rather than shrunk; the very recent $1.63B YTD repurchase program is not yet visible in these multi-year ratios.

SourcePortfolio snapshot 30.05.2026.txt ^[9]

Part 5

Valuation

5.1Current Multiples vs 10-Year Context

Multiple	Current	10yr median	Read
P / FCF	22.7x	50.6x	Cheapest CPRT has been on P/FCF in years
EV / FCF	18.6x	—	Net cash strips ~$4B from EV
EV / EBIT	15.6x	—	Low for a 26% ROIC business
P / E (no NRI)	20.5x	—	Deeply compressed vs history
FCF Yield	4.64%	—	Inverse of P/FCF; rises further on EV basis

EV view matters EV/FCF of ~18.6x vs P/FCF of ~22.7x reflects that ~$4B of market cap is essentially idle cash. An owner who mentally strips the cash is buying the operating business at the lower EV-based yield. Cash deployed at 43% ROIIC adds further per-share value.

SourceCPRT-DOSSIER.md §8 ^[1]

5.2Reverse DCF — What the Market Prices In

Two-stage model, 10% discount rate, 10-year growth stage + terminal. Analysis price ~$32.87 (March 2026).

Stage	Growth rate	Terminal	Implied fair value
Market implied	~14–15%	3%	~$32.87

What this means At ~$32.87 the market is implying ~14–15% FCF/share growth for 10 years + 3% terminal. That is materially below the 5-year FCF CAGR of 26.8% and the 10-year CAGR of 23.3%, and roughly in line with the cyclical-trough 3-year CAGR of 13.1%. The market is pricing the trough rate as the new normal — which the structural evidence (rising TLF, record ASPs, ROIIC 43%) does not support.

SourceCPRT-DOSSIER.md §8 ^[1]

5.3DCF Scenarios

Scenario	Stage 1 (10yr)	Terminal	Fair value	vs $32.87
Bear (3yr CAGR sustained)	13%	3%	~$28	-15%
Market implied	14–15%	3%	~$32.87	—
Base (5yr trend, discounted)	20%	3%	~$45.61	+39%
Bull (match 10yr CAGR)	23%	3%	~$55.76	+70%

Asymmetry The base case at 20% Stage 1 (discounted from the 5-year trend of 26.8%) implies ~$45.61, a +39% spread to today. The bear case requires that the insurance pullback be structural — a thesis that contradicts every observable data point: TLF at 23.6% and climbing, ASPs at records, FCF growing, and 1M+ global buyers still bidding competitively. Cash redeployment to buybacks at ~22.7x P/FCF adds further per-share value not in any scenario.

SourceCPRT-DOSSIER.md §8 ^[1]

Part 6

Risks

6.1Red flags, ranked by severity

Cyclical insurance unit volume decline — healing but not yet recoveredSeverity: medium-high. Global insurance units -2.7% YoY in Q3 (improving from -9% in Q2). Drivers: consumers paring back auto coverage (1-in-6 policyholders reduced coverage; earned car years -4% YoY per ISS Fast Track even as VIO grew +1.4%) and differential carrier growth. Cyclical thesis intact, but until unit volumes return to positive territory, the revenue growth stall is a fact. The single item worth watching most closely.
Insurance seller concentration ~81–83%Severity: medium. 10-K identifies concentration risk. Mitigants are strong (Title Express integration at 5–8x competitor scale, owned-lot infrastructure, proprietary auction data, switching costs), but losing a major carrier relationship would be material. Non-insurance expansion (BluCar, Purple Wave, fleet/finance) is directly addressing this over time.
International expansion — regulatory friction and margin lagSeverity: medium. Germany in particular has title/registration regulatory friction. International margin 31.5% still ~700 bps below US (38.1%). Each new market (India, Bahrain, Oman, UAE) requires up-front land and lot capex before meaningful volume. Capital deployed at sub-hurdle returns for the first several years per country.
Land acquisition lead timeSeverity: medium-low. Copart cannot respond quickly to sudden volume surges in new geographies. The 20/20/20 program (2016) addressed the legacy deficit; capacity now stronger than demand. But land acquisition is a years-long process and miscalculating demand geography would constrain growth or force inefficient operations. Capex was $258M in 9M FY2026.
$4.2B cash pile — question, not answerSeverity: medium-low. $4.2B in cash and securities with zero debt is extraordinary financial security, but it earns much less than 43% historical ROIIC. Management has demonstrated discipline via $1.63B YTD buybacks, but the optimal deployment (more land, M&A, buybacks, special dividend) has not been explicitly stated. High-quality problem that demands an answer eventually.
Purple Wave tariff headwindsSeverity: low. Management flagged in Q2 that international buyer demand for US-origin heavy equipment is dampened by tariff uncertainty. Tracked; small; not a core thesis risk.
Fuel and towing cost exposureSeverity: low. Hybrid towing network (owned trucks, Truck in a Box contractors, third-party subs); fuel prices flow through all three channels. Management adjusts rates market-by-market to maintain margins. No material margin impact flagged recently.

SourceCPRT-DOSSIER.md §6 ^[1]

Verdict

Initiate / accumulate on weakness · business quality is exceptional; cycle is clearing

Stance: Initiate / accumulate on weakness. ~22.7x P/FCF on snapshot with market pricing ~14–15% growth. Bear (13%): -15%. Base (20%): +39%. Business quality is exceptional; cyclical headwind is clearing; the cash pile and aggressive buybacks are insider-level conviction signals.
Add zone: Below ~$33 absent worsening of the insurance unit cycle, especially while management is still buying back at scale.
Trim trigger: Insurance units negative for two further quarters past Q4 FY2026 (i.e. the cyclical trough thesis fails); OR ASP growth turning negative; OR buybacks stop without redeployment to acquisitions / international.
Watching: Q4 FY2026 global insurance unit growth (priority 1, August 2026 results), US insurance ASP YoY, international OM convergence toward US levels, cash pile deployment cadence, non-insurance unit growth, AI tool adoption by carriers.
Next review: Q4 FY2026 report — expected August 2026.

Last reviewed May 25, 2026 after Q3 FY2026 results · Next review Aug 2026 (Q4 FY2026)

References

Where every claim came from

[1]Company information/Copart/CPRT-DOSSIER.mdLiving research-report source file, last updated 2026-05-25. Primary reference for all qualitative and quantitative content unless otherwise noted.
[2]Company information/Copart/10K 2025.pdfFY2025 annual report (10-K) — primary source for business model, seller mix, lot count, segment structure.
[3]Company information/Copart/cprt-04-30-26-earnings-release.pdfQ3 FY2026 earnings release, quarter ended April 30, 2026 — primary source for the headline numbers in Part 1.2.
[4]Company information/Copart/Q3 2026.mdInternal Q3 FY2026 earnings analysis — primary source for KPIs and operational colour.
[5]Company information/Copart/Q1-Q2 2026 · Earnings Call Transcript.pdfManagement commentary from Liaw and Stearns on cyclical pullback, ASPs, FCF, AI deployment, international, buyback rationale.
[6]Company information/Copart/Q2 2026 10Q.pdf and Q1 2026 10Q.pdfRaw interim filings for balance sheet snapshots and 9M YTD figures.
[7]Company information/Copart/CPRT-earnings-analysis-FY2025-H1FY2026.mdInternal earnings analysis covering FY2025 results and the first half of FY2026.
[8]Stock portfolio/Meta analysis from poorcharlie.io.txtScoring framework and additional-moat checklist; used for the structure of Part 2.4 only, not for Copart-specific content.
[9]Stock portfolio/Portfolio snapshot 30.05.2026.txtGuruFocus portfolio snapshot exported 2026-05-30; primary source for Part 4 ratios.

This is one of three free sample reports.
Members get the full research universe: all 47 today, growing to 80, with quarterly updates after every earnings release.

See access plans