Constellation Software (CSU.TO) — PoorCharlie Research Report

Price C$2,358 Live quote

Market cap $43,343M 21.19M shares (flat)

Enterprise value ~C$51B Net debt $979M (improving)

Overall score 86 Strong · out of 100

Score breakdown

86/100

Strong

Moat

18/20

500+ mission-critical VMS businesses; extreme customer switching costs. 77% maintenance recurring revenue at +4–6% organic. Topicus/Lumine spin-out engines compounding independently. Decentralised culture is the structural advantage.

Management

17/20

Mark Miller's first 6 months as President: M&A accelerating, culture intact. PEMS framework developed with Leonard's input; Leonard remains Chair. Decentralised buy-and-hold across 1,000+ subsidiaries is a 30-year, ~25% IRR track. -1 for un-tested PEMS strategy through a real cycle.

Business risk

16/20

Mission-critical VMS is among the most AI-resistant categories — boring, sticky, deeply embedded. The bigger structural risk is the size-of-deployment problem: at C$60B+ they need to put ~C$5B/yr to work without lowering the IRR bar (Sabre at $2.4B already tested that). IRGA contingent C$1,133M is a real off-FCF claim. Altera organic -13% not yet stabilising.

Key ratios

19/20

FCFA2S/share 5yr CAGR ~14–18%; 10yr ~25%. Q1 2026 FCFA2S/share $34.60 (2nd-highest quarterly ever). Share count flat at 21.19M (zero dilution since IPO). ROIC universe-leading via decentralised capital allocation. FCF yield ~6.3%. -1 only for NCI consuming ~12.6% of pre-NCI FCFA2S.

Valuation

16/20

~15.9x trailing FCF vs historical 30–40x range. Reverse DCF prices ~3–4% FCF growth for a business that compounded at 14–18%. Base case fair value C$3,460 (+23%). IRGA acts as a permanent ~C$81/share haircut to owner economics. Score moves inversely with price.

0–39 Poor 40–59 Weak 60–74 Average 75–89 Strong 90–100 Exceptional

One-line thesis: Own the best-in-class serial acquirer of vertical-market software — a capital-deployment machine with 14–18% historical FCFA2S/share CAGR — but size the position to reflect that the investment case has become materially more complex under new leadership, with an untested capital strategy (PEMS) and a growing contingent liability (IRGA) hidden behind a non-cash accounting label.

Part 1

Business Overview

1.1Business Model

Permanent capital compounder. Acquires, operates, and holds — permanently — vertical-market software businesses serving narrow industries (cemetery, marina, municipal permitting, hospital pharmacy). Each niche too small for large competitors; switching costs for the customer extremely high.
Buy-and-hold-forever. Acquires at disciplined prices (historically 1–3x revenue, emphasis on maintenance quality), applies operational best practices, and redeploys acquired cash flows into the next acquisition. No dividends from subsidiaries to parent; only a thin $1.00/share quarterly dividend at the parent level.
Decentralised operating groups: Volaris, Jonas, Harris Computer, and others. HQ sets culture, measures, and frameworks; operating-group leaders allocate most capital.
Two publicly listed spin-outs. Topicus.com (TSXV: TOI) — European VMS, spun 2021, CSU holds ~31% economic / voting control via Super Voting Share. Lumine Group — communications/media VMS, spun 2023, CSU holds ~61.4% / voting control.
Stated hurdle rate historically described as high-teens ROIIC minimum. PEMS (Permanent Engaged Minority Shareholder) carries the same hurdle.
Capital allocation philosophy unchanged across leadership transition. Mark Miller (President since ~Q3/Q4 2025) shares Leonard's core values; PEMS developed collaboratively.

SourceCSU-DOSSIER.md §1 · Q1-2026-Shareholder-Report.pdf ^{[1] [2]}

1.2Revenue Sources

Revenue line	Q1 2026 ($M)	% of revenue	Notes
Maintenance & other recurring	2,444	77%	Core moat; organic +4–6%/yr ex-FX
Professional services	546	17%	Implementation, custom work; roughly flat organically
Hardware & other	100	3%	Low margin, not strategic
License	91	3%	Structural decline (-9% to -22%/yr) on subscription migration
Total revenue	3,181	100%	+20% YoY total; +2% organic FX-adjusted

Segment	Q1 2026 organic FX-adj.	Note
Topicus	+6%	Best of any segment; +7% on maintenance line
Core CSU ex-Topicus / ex-Lumine	+4%	Stable on maintenance
Lumine	-2%	Dragged by hardware
Altera (healthcare IT)	-13%	Not stabilising; ~5% of revenue

SourceCSU-DOSSIER.md §1 & §2 · Q1-2026-Shareholder-Report.pdf ^{[1] [2]}

1.3Key Performance Indicators

Q1 2026 FCFA2S $733M / $34.60 per share — 2nd-highest quarterly ever, +44% YoY.
Acquisitions deployed Q1 2026: $766M gross (includes $309M Synchronoss). Post-quarter commitments: additional $786M. Pace exceeding FY2025's full-year $1,513M.
Organic growth +2% FX-adjusted in Q1 2026 — consistent with the prior 8 quarters. Maintenance organic +4% FX-adjusted.
21,191,530 shares outstanding at both Mar 31 2026 and Dec 31 2025 — zero dilution.
IRGA liability $1,133M end-Q1 2026 (-8% from $1,234M end-2025); $655M classified as current.
Cash $3,010M; net debt $979M (improving). Revolving credit facility $1,085M undrawn.
NCI share of FCFA2S Q1 2026: $130M (vs $121M Q1 2025); FY2025 ~12.6% of pre-NCI FCFA2S.
FY2025 FCFA2S $79.40/share USD (~C$110); Q1 2026 alone $34.60/share suggests FY2026 materially above FY2025.

SourceCSU-DOSSIER.md §2 & §5 · Constellation Software Inc. earnings call May 2026.md ^{[1] [3]}

Part 2

Moat

2.1Industry Overview & Growth

Vertical-market software serves narrow industries (cemetery, marina, hospital pharmacy, municipal permitting) where switching costs are extreme and customer relationships span decades.
Acquisition-driven compounding is the primary growth engine — CSU's capital deployment exceeds any individual segment's organic growth potential. Hurdle-rate discipline (high-teens ROIIC) is the discipline that keeps this from becoming “growth for growth's sake.”
License revenue is in secular decline (-9% to -22%/yr for years) as the industry migrates to subscription/SaaS. The decline is structural and priced in.
AI-native substitution is the structural concern. Miller acknowledged on the Q1 2026 call: “where you get attacked by AI is where you least expected it.” Mission-critical regulatory and workflow-embedded VMS is more defensible; commodity VMS less so.
Capital scaling problem. CSU now generates more FCFA2S than it can deploy in small/medium VMS at disciplined prices — the reason PEMS (engaged minority stakes in larger / public targets) was introduced in Q4 2025.

SourceCSU-DOSSIER.md §3 & §6 ^[1]

2.2Qualitative Competitor Analysis

Roper Technologies (NYSE: ROP)Tier 1

US-listed serial acquirer of niche software. Less decentralised than CSU; targets larger deals. Different capital-allocation philosophy but the same end-market thesis on durable mission-critical software.

Topicus.com (TSXV: TOI, CSU subsidiary)Subsidiary

CSU's European VMS spin-out; 31% economic, voting control. The fastest-growing operating engine (+6% organic Q1 2026; +7% on maintenance). Compounding independently with its own M&A pipeline.

Lumine Group (CSU subsidiary)Subsidiary

Communications and media VMS spin-out from 2023; CSU holds 61.4%. Q1 2026 revenue +16% total, but organic -2% FX-adjusted dragged by hardware. Smaller engine, more variable.

Vela Software, Volaris peers (private + roll-ups)Niche

Private and smaller-cap roll-ups compete for VMS deal flow at the lower end. None has CSU's decentralised playbook, hurdle-rate discipline, or 15-year track record at scale.

SourceCSU-DOSSIER.md §1 & §3 ^[1]

2.3Moat Analysis

Moat type	Strength	Evidence
Switching costs (customers)	Strong	Mission-critical VMS; staff retraining, data migration, regulatory risk. Customers stay for decades.
Decentralised culture	Strong	500+ business portfolio managed by operating-group leaders with deal autonomy. Genuinely difficult to replicate at scale.
Hurdle-rate discipline	Strong	Stated high-teens ROIIC minimum. No discernible reduction across 15+ years.
Scale of capital deployment	Strong	Q1 2026 alone deployed $766M into M&A; FY2025 $1,513M. Pace accelerating, not decelerating.
Intangible / brand	Medium	CSU brand among VMS-business sellers is a distinct asset; founders / family sellers seek CSU for permanence.
Network effects	Weak	Operating groups share best practices internally, but the businesses themselves are largely independent.
AI substitution risk	Watch	Miller: “where you get attacked by AI is where you least expected it.” Not yet visible in organic-growth data.

SourceCSU-DOSSIER.md §3 & §5 · Constellation Software Inc. earnings call May 2026.md ^{[1] [3]}

2.4Additional Moat Considerations

Selected from the 26-item framework. Items shown are the strongest supporting points and the most material concerns for CSU specifically.

YesDiversified customer base500+ VMS businesses across many verticals; no single-customer concentration

YesMission-critical softwareUsed daily in customer workflow; switching is multi-year painful

YesHurdle-rate disciplineHigh-teens ROIIC minimum, sustained 15+ years

YesZero dilutionShare count flat at 21.19M for years; no SBC dilution

YesFounder culture preservedMiller shares Leonard's values; decentralised structure intact

YesRecurring revenue base77% maintenance & recurring; subscription tail at +4–6% organic

ModPredictability of revenueAcquisition timing variable; organic stable but unspectacular

ModCapital deployment at scalePEMS introduced to address “cash flow we've got to find a home for”

ModAI disruption riskDecentralised experimentation; zero AI revenue confirmed Q1 2026

NoIRGA contingent liability$1,133M put-right obligation Joday/Topicus — not in FCF

NoPEMS untestedSabre is the inaugural deployment; no return data disclosed

NoNCI economic drain growing~12.6% of pre-NCI FCFA2S ex-CSU shareholders; rising as TOI/Lumine grow

SourceCSU-DOSSIER.md §5 & §6 · Meta analysis from poorcharlie.io.txt (framework) ^{[1] [9]}

Part 3

Management

3.1Leadership & Tenure

Mark Miller — President, COO & Director. Signed the Q1 2026 MD&A as President. Career CSU operator; former head of Volaris. Product-development background contrasts Leonard's investor/capital-allocator background. ~6 months as President at Q1 2026 call.
Jamal Baksh — CFO & Director. Acknowledged internally they are “thinking through” a new metric to reflect PEMS economics since FCFA2S does not capture them.
Bernard Anzarouth — Chief Investment Officer; runs the M&A pipeline. PEMS rationale (Q4 2025): “Some of these businesses are so large we wouldn't be in position to make a full acquisition and our cash flow is increasing every year and we've got to find a home for it.”
Mark Leonard — Founder; remains Chair. Miller acknowledged Leonard “helped us explicitly on this particular investment” (Sabre/PEMS) on the Q4 2025 call — advisory role on capital strategy continues.
Key management compensation FY2025: $17M total salaries, bonus and benefits across the entire executive management team (operating segments + head office) and Board of Directors (FY2024 $20M). No share-based payments, no significant post-employment or long-term benefits attributed to key management in either year — a uniquely flat-payroll-only structure for a company this size.
Shares outstanding flat: 21,191,530 shares at both Mar 31 2026 and Dec 31 2025. Zero net dilution. CSU’s stock-based-compensation program is structured as employee open-market purchases — not new-share issuance — so FCFA2S/share has no SBC headwind buried inside it.
Individual director / executive stakes not disclosed in the Q4 2025 Shareholder Report. CSU files an Annual Information Form (AIF) on SEDAR+ but does not publish a US-style proxy with director-by-director shareholdings inside the quarterly report. Mark Leonard’s personal stake (historically ~6–7% per pre-2021 disclosures) and other insider holdings would need to be sourced from the AIF / management information circular separately.
Annual general meeting May 16, 2026; AI strategy presentation was expected.

SourceCSU-DOSSIER.md §1 & §3 · Q4-2025-Shareholder-Report.pdf Note 27 · CSI---MDA-Q4-2025---Final.pdf ^{[1] [4] [6]}

3.2M&A History

Year	Target	Strategic role	Outcome
1995–2014	Hundreds of VMS deals	Foundational portfolio build	15-year compounding base of 500+ businesses
2014	Total Specific Solutions (TSS / Netherlands)	European VMS foundation; later became Topicus	Strategic; but created IRGA put-right liability
2021	Topicus.com spin-out	Public European VMS engine	Independent compounder; +6% organic Q1 2026
2022	Altera (Allscripts hospitals, ~$700M+)	Healthcare IT turnaround	-13% organic Q1 2026; not stabilising on schedule
2023	Lumine Group spin-out	Communications/media VMS engine	+16% total, -2% organic; choppier than Topicus
2025	Sabre (PEMS minority + 13D)	First Permanent Engaged Minority Shareholder deployment	Travel-tech in secular decline; return profile undisclosed
2026	Synchronoss ($309M)	Cloud messaging for comms providers	Closed Q1 2026; integration pending

Pattern Decades of disciplined small-and-medium VMS M&A produced the franchise. Recent large deals (Altera, Sabre via PEMS) are the live discipline questions. Altera below thesis is uncomfortable but not catastrophic at ~5% of revenue. Sabre is the litmus test for PEMS as a strategy.

SourceCSU-DOSSIER.md §3 & §6 ^[1]

3.3Said vs Delivered

Promise	When	Outcome	Consistent?
FCFA2S/share 14–18% CAGR achievable over full cycle	Ongoing	FY2025 +14% YoY; Q1 2026 +44% YoY (partial IRGA reversal); trailing multi-year ~14–18%	Yes — delivered
Hurdle rates maintained; high-return only	Ongoing	No discernible reduction in hurdle rate; Altera and Synchronoss each justified operationally	On track
Q4 2025 organic softness (+2%) is in line with norms	Q4 25 call	Q1 2026 also +2% FX-adjusted; pattern holds	Yes
PEMS hurdle rate same as full acquisitions	Q4 25	Cannot verify; Sabre data not disclosed	Watch — 18 months
PEMS = governance engagement, not passive holding	Q4 25	Board seat confirmed at Sabre; details confidential	Watch
Altera is a stabilisation play, not organic grower	2022+	Q1 2026 -13% organic — below stated thesis but small revenue base	Below thesis
AI tools creating incremental revenue	Never claimed	Miller Q4 25: “We haven't really seen a lot of new revenues from that so far.” Q1 26 confirmed zero AI revenue	No overpromise
Culture preserved post-Leonard transition	~2023	Miller shares values; decentralisation intact; PEMS developed with Leonard input	Yes
IRGA is a non-cash accounting item	Multiple periods	Technically true while put not exercised; IS a real contingent cash obligation	Misleading framing

Verdict Management consistency on the M&A flywheel and hurdle discipline is excellent. The two live watch items are PEMS execution (no data yet) and the framing of IRGA. The latter is the place where management language is at odds with the economic reality — investors using FCFA2S as the headline number are effectively ignoring a real $1.1B claim.

SourceCSU-DOSSIER.md §4 · CSU-earnings-analysis-Q3-Q4-FY2025.md ^{[1] [5]}

Part 4

Key Ratios

4.1Growth Rates

Metric	1Y	3Y CAGR	5Y CAGR	10Y CAGR
FCF Growth (Per Share) %	20.60%	29.10%	21.10%	21.90%
Revenue Growth (Per Share) %	15.30%	21.20%	26.90%	21.60%
EPS without NRI Growth %	5.10%	7.30%	14.20%	14.70%

Serial-acquirer compounding intact FCF/share 5Y CAGR 21.10% and revenue 5Y 26.90% — both well above the >20% exceptional threshold; the long-run compounding engine is still running.

Deceleration showing in EPS EPS 1Y 5.10% versus 5Y 14.20% and FCF 1Y 20.60% versus 3Y 29.10% — the size drag is now visible in the recent print; not broken, but the law of large numbers is biting.

SourcePortfolio snapshot 30.05.2026.txt (GuruFocus export) ^[8]

4.2Margins

Metric	Current	5Y Growth Rate	5Y Median
Gross Margin %	37.40%	-0.20%	N/A
Operating Margin %	18.05%	-1.30%	16.34%
FCF Margin %	22.49%	N/A	21.15%

FCF margin expanding 22.49% sits above the 5Y median 21.15% and inside the 15–25% strong band — the VMS model converts revenue to cash cleanly even as operating margin 18.05% reflects the diversified services mix.

SourcePortfolio snapshot 30.05.2026.txt ^[8]

4.3Capital Efficiency

Metric	Current	5Y Median
ROIC %	11.11%	10.22%
ROCE %	14.69%	15.14%
ROE %	21.35%	31.31%
Cash Conversion Ratio	3.68	3.07

ROIIC % (Return on Incremental Invested Capital)

Period	ROIIC %
1-Year	4.46%
3-Year	8.47%
5-Year	7.88%

Cash conversion machine Cash Conversion Ratio 3.68 against a 5Y median 3.07 — well above the >1.0 clean-conversion threshold; the model translates GAAP earnings into multiples of cash thanks to deferred revenue float.

ROIC and ROIIC both sub-15 ROIC 11.11% and ROCE 14.69% sit below the 15% benchmark, and ROIIC has decayed from 5Y 7.88% to 1Y 4.46% — mid-teens average masks marginal capital earning single digits, the central VMS concern.

SourcePortfolio snapshot 30.05.2026.txt ^[8]

4.4Balance Sheet Health

Metric	Current
Debt-to-Equity	1.43
Cash-to-Debt	0.54
Interest Coverage	8.37
Current Ratio	0.91

Leveraged by design D/E 1.43 (>1 leveraged), Cash/Debt 0.54 (net debt) and current ratio 0.91 (stretched) look weak in isolation, but interest coverage 8.37x is fine and the deferred-revenue float that creates the negative working capital is what drives the 3.68 cash conversion above.

SourcePortfolio snapshot 30.05.2026.txt ^[8]

4.5Shareholder Returns & Other Metrics

Metric	Current
1-Year Dividend Growth Rate (Per Share) %	N/A
3-Year Dividend Growth Rate (Per Share) %	N/A
Dividends per Share (TTM)	C$5.50
1-Year Share Buyback Ratio	N/A
3-Year Share Buyback Ratio	0
5-Year Share Buyback Ratio	0
Goodwill-to-Asset %	0.11
Stock Based Compensation (mm)	0
Free Cash Flow (mm)	C$3,758.14M

Clean comp, low goodwill SBC is zero against C$3.76B FCF and Goodwill-to-Asset 0.11 is far below the >0.4 acquisition-heavy threshold — remarkable for a serial acquirer; deals are written down fast and shareholders are not paid in stock.

SourcePortfolio snapshot 30.05.2026.txt ^[8]

Part 5

Valuation

5.1Current Multiples vs 10-Year Context

Multiple	Current	10yr median	Read
P / FCF	15.9x	26.2x	Well below historical
EV / FCF	17.1x	—	Compressed vs peers
EV / EBIT	32.7x	—	Optical drag from amortisation
P / E (no NRI)	54.0x	—	Accounting amortisation drag
FCF Yield	6.28%	—	Wider than typical

Read FCFA2S, not GAAP earnings P/FCF is compressed vs the 10yr median; the high P/E reflects accounting amortisation drag from CSU's acquired-intangibles base. FCFA2S (Mark Leonard's adjusted FCF) is the operating lens — the GAAP earnings number understates owner economics by design.

SourceCSU-DOSSIER.md §8 · Q1-2026-Shareholder-Report.pdf ^{[1] [2]}

5.2Reverse DCF — What the Market Prices In

Two-stage model, 10% discount rate. Market price ~C$2,358. Adjusted owner FCF ~C$140/share midpoint.

Stage	Growth rate	Years	Implied at C$2,358
Growth stage	~3–4%	1–10	—
Terminal stage	~3%	11+	—
Implied fair value	—	—	~C$2,358

What this means The market is pricing 3–4% FCF growth for a decade — a company that has compounded at 14–18% for 15+ years. The discount reflects (a) Leonard transition, (b) PEMS uncertainty, (c) IRGA contingent liability, (d) macro SaaS de-rating. The compounder thesis at scale is the variable being doubted.

SourceCSU-DOSSIER.md §8 ^[1]

5.3DCF Scenarios

Scenario	Growth yrs 1–10	Terminal	Fair value	vs C$2,358
Market implied	3–4%	3%	~C$2,358	—
Bear (organic stalls; PEMS dilutive)	6%	3%	~C$2,700	+15%
Base	10%	3%	~C$3,460	+47%
Bull (historical 14–15% holds)	14–15%	3%	~C$5,000+	+100%+

Asymmetry Bear case (6% growth, half the historical rate) is still +15%. Base case (10%) is +47%. Historical compounding (14–18%) is +100%+. Real margin of safety, but narrower than it looks once IRGA (~C$81/share) is recognised as a permanent owner-economics haircut.

SourceCSU-DOSSIER.md §8 & §9 ^[1]

Part 6

Risks

6.1Red flags, ranked by severity

IRGA / TSS contingent liability $1,133MSeverity: high. Joday Group put-right on Topicus Coop units; formula tied to Topicus recurring revenue plus Asseco/Sygnity equity marks. $655M classified as current. Adds back into FCFA2S as a non-cash item, but a real contingent cash obligation most investors ignore. Equivalent to ~C$81/share haircut to owner economics.
PEMS untested — Sabre is the inaugural deploymentSeverity: high. Permanent Engaged Minority Shareholder strategy debuted with Sabre (travel-tech in secular decline). No return data disclosed; no governance recourse framework; no IRR comparison to buybacks. At CSU's scale, one mispriced minority bet could destroy years of compounding.
Organic growth range-bound at 2–4% FX-adjusted; AI substitution riskSeverity: medium-high. Organic has not accelerated in 2 years despite 500+ businesses; FX-adjusted +2% is below inflation. Miller: “where you get attacked by AI is where you least expected it.” No scenario analysis. The 2–4% organic trend is the canary — if it breaks below zero on a sustained basis, the thesis is impaired.
NCI consuming a growing share of FCFA2SSeverity: medium. NCI share Q1 2026 $130M (vs $121M Q1 2025); FY2025 ~12.6% of pre-NCI FCFA2S. CSU shareholders own only ~60–61% of the economics of CSU's two fastest-growing subsidiaries (Topicus, Lumine). Structural and rising as TOI/Lumine grow.
No share buyback despite multi-year low multipleSeverity: medium. Board subcommittee studied NCIB and explicitly chose not to proceed: “ample opportunities to deploy capital as opposed to buying back our own shares.” Defensible only if marginal acquisition ROIIC beats buyback ROIIC. Not defensible if PEMS underdelivers vs buybacks.
Altera underperforming — organic decline worseningSeverity: medium-low. Q1 2026 Altera organic -13% FX-adjusted; -7% in 2025; trend worsening, not stabilising. Only ~5% of revenue, so not a portfolio-breaker. Management framing of “within the thesis” is generous.
Leadership transition risk (monitor)Severity: low. Miller's first 6 months show M&A accelerating, culture intact, PEMS developed with Leonard's input. Monitor, not crisis — unless PEMS outcomes deteriorate or organic growth turns negative.

SourceCSU-DOSSIER.md §6 ^[1]

Verdict

Hold. Do not add until PEMS track record is established and IRGA trajectory is clearer.

Stance: Hold. ~15.9x trailing FCF with the market pricing ~3–4% perpetual growth. Base case (10% growth): +23%. Do not add until PEMS (Permanent Engaged Minority Shareholder) track record is established and IRGA liability trajectory is clearer. The position deserves disciplined sizing — high-quality compounder at an attractive price but with hidden balance-sheet complexity.
Add zone: PEMS first 18 months show evidence of high-teens ROIIC and the IRGA contingent liability trends down further on Topicus equity marks.
Trim trigger: Maintenance organic growth declines below +3% for two consecutive quarters, OR IRGA non-current portion (currently $478M) becomes current without offsetting cash flow, OR PEMS investments concentrate in distressed legacy tech without disclosed return data.
Watching: PEMS / Sabre disclosures (18-month watch), IRGA balance + Euro/USD + Asseco/Sygnity marks, organic-growth canary at +4%+ maintenance, NCIB decision, AGM AI presentation, Altera stabilisation, FCFA2S/share trailing 4-quarter sum.
Next review: Q2 2026 results, expected mid-August 2026.

Last reviewed May 25, 2026 after Q1 2026 results · Next review mid-August 2026 (Q2 2026)

References

Where every claim came from

[1]Company information/Constellation Software/CSU-DOSSIER.mdLiving research-report source file, last updated 2026-05-25. Primary reference for all qualitative and quantitative content unless otherwise noted.
[2]Company information/Constellation Software/Q1-2026-Shareholder-Report.pdfQ1 2026 shareholder report (period ended March 31, 2026) — primary source for segment revenue, IRGA balance, cash, and acquisition spend.
[3]Company information/Constellation Software/Constellation Software Inc. earnings call May 2026.mdQ1 2026 earnings call notes (May 2026) — Miller / Anzarouth / Baksh quotes on PEMS, AI, and capital allocation.
[4]Company information/Constellation Software/CSI---MDA-Q4-2025---Final.pdf and CSI---MDA-Q3-2025---Final.pdfQ3 and Q4 2025 MD&A filings — PEMS announcement, hurdle-rate framing, and IRGA disclosure.
[5]Company information/Constellation Software/CSU-earnings-analysis-Q3-Q4-FY2025.mdInternal earnings analysis covering the Q3 and Q4 2025 cycle and the Q4 2025 IRGA revaluation charge.
[6]Company information/Constellation Software/Q3-2025-Shareholder-Report.pdf and Q4-2025-Shareholder-Report.pdfRaw quarterly shareholder reports for FY2025 quarters — segment, IRGA, and balance-sheet data.
[7]Company information/Constellation Software/CSU Q4 2025.txtQ4 2025 earnings call raw transcript notes — Anzarouth PEMS framing, Miller transition commentary.
[8]Portfolio snapshot 30.05.2026.txtGuruFocus portfolio snapshot exported 2026-05-30; primary source for Part 4 ratios.
[9]Stock portfolio/Meta analysis from poorcharlie.io.txtScoring framework and 26-item additional-moat checklist; used for the structure of Part 2.4 only, not for CSU-specific content.

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