Universe / INTU
NASDAQ : INTU · Technology · Financial Software (Tax, Accounting, Fintech)

Intuit Inc.

Founded 1983 · HQ Mountain View · TurboTax · QuickBooks · Credit Karma · Mailchimp · Last report update Jun 7, 2026 (through Q3 FY2026)

Live quote · Yahoo Finance
Price $296.76 today
Market cap $81,175M 273.5M shares
Enterprise value $79.6B ~$1.5B net cash
Overall score 80 Strong · out of 100
Score breakdown
80/100
Strong
Moat
17/20
Dominant in consumer tax (TurboTax) and small-business accounting (QuickBooks). Very high switching costs in mission-critical, regulated workflows, plus a data and network advantage across ~10M businesses and ~1M accountants. The one live structural threat is AI-native competition, which is exactly what the de-rating is about.
Management
17/20
CEO Sasan Goodarzi (since 2019) is a proven operator and capital allocator: aggressive buybacks at the lows, a 15% dividend raise, and a disciplined 17% workforce cut with savings flowing to the bottom line. Candid about the low-end tax miss ("we lost on price"). Long compounding track record.
Business risk
13/20
The large unresolved risk is AI disintermediation of tax and accounting software, which is only partially understood and drove a ~60% de-rating. Plus low-end DIY tax share loss, a Mailchimp drag, high stock comp, and tax-season seasonality. Offsets: ~37% FCF margin, recurring revenue, fortress balance sheet.
Key ratios
16/20
FCF margin ~37%, gross margin 80%, ROCE 23%, and 5-year revenue/share and EPS growth of ~18% and ~21% are universe-class. The laggards: ROIC ~14.5% and 5-year incremental returns are dragged down by acquisition goodwill (Credit Karma, Mailchimp), and stock-based comp is high.
Valuation
17/20
~10.7x free cash flow vs a 10-year median near 32x. Reverse-DCF implies only ~3% perpetual growth on a business compounding in the high teens. Base case $450 fair value = +52%. Bear (zero growth) = -18%. Score moves inversely with price.
0–39 Poor 40–59 Weak 60–74 Average 75–89 Strong 90–100 Exceptional

One-line thesis: One of the highest-quality software franchises in the world, down roughly 60% from its high and priced for AI to kill it, while the actual results show double-digit revenue growth, three engines compounding above 30%, and management buying back stock hand over fist. The debate is whether AI disintermediates tax and accounting, or whether confidence, compliance and human expertise keep the moat intact.

Part 1

Business Overview

1.1Business Model

  • A financial-software platform built around four franchises: TurboTax (consumer tax), QuickBooks (small-business accounting, payments and payroll), Credit Karma (consumer fintech), and Mailchimp (marketing).

    As of August 2025 Intuit reorganized into two reporting segments. Global Business Solutions is the QuickBooks ecosystem (online accounting, payments, capital, Bill Pay, payroll, Mailchimp, plus Desktop). Consumer now bundles TurboTax, Credit Karma and ProTax (the professional-accountant tax tools: Lacerte, ProSeries, ProConnect).

    Revenue is a mix of software subscriptions, transaction fees (payments, fast-money refund products) and expert services. The model throws off ~37% free cash flow margins on 80% gross margins, with a strong seasonal peak in the fiscal third quarter (the US tax season).

  • The strategy is an "AI-driven expert platform": proprietary data plus domain-specific AI plus AI-powered human expertise, sold as a single system that does the work for the customer.

    Management's core framing, from CEO Sasan Goodarzi: “customers buy confidence, not code, which is why they spend at least 7x more on accounting and tax experts than on software alone.” The bet is that combining software with on-platform human experts wins in high-stakes, regulated decisions where the customer wants to delegate liability.

    The platform spans “lead to cash” for businesses and “credit building to wealth building” for consumers. Intuit puts its total addressable market at ~$300bn with only ~6% penetration today.

  • A data and network advantage across approximately 10 million business customers and 1 million accountants, feeding AI agents that act inside customer workflows.

    A strategic pivot underway: accountants are being treated as customers, not just a referral channel. The new Intuit Accountant Suite lets a firm run its own practice and manage its clients on one platform, and (based on partnership tier) connects accountants with new customers, strengthening the network effect.

    Proof points from Q3: AI accounting agents power recommendations across “more than 50 million transactions each week,” and a sweeping platform expansion with consumption-based pricing launches in August 2026.

  • Largely US-centric and recurring, with a pronounced seasonal peak: the fiscal third quarter (ending April 30) captures the bulk of consumer tax revenue and margin.
SourceINTU-DOSSIER.md · Q3 2026 Earnings Call Transcript · Q3 FY26 Fact Sheet [1] [2] [3]

1.2Revenue by Segment — Q3 FY2026

SegmentQ3 revenueYoY% of revenue
Global Business Solutions $3,285M+15%38%

The QuickBooks engine. Online ecosystem revenue grew 19% (22% excluding Mailchimp). QuickBooks Online accounting revenue grew 22% on higher effective prices, customer growth and mix. The standout is mid-market: online ecosystem revenue for QuickBooks Advanced plus Intuit Enterprise Suite grew approximately 38%, with Enterprise Suite contracts up 37% quarter-over-quarter as the direct sales force scales ~30%.

Within online services, money (payments, capital, Bill Pay) and payroll drove growth; total online payment volume grew 30% including Bill Pay (18% excluding it). The one soft spot inside the segment is Mailchimp, down slightly year-over-year and being rightsized.

Consumer — TurboTax $4,364M+7%51%

Assisted up, low-end DIY down. The win: TurboTax Live (software plus a human expert) is expected to grow customers 38% and revenue 36% this year, reaching 53% of total TurboTax revenue, up 11 points. New assisted customers grew 29%, and retention in TurboTax Live rose 2 points.

The miss: Intuit lost share in the most price-sensitive do-it-yourself segment, filers earning under $50,000. Sasan: “I'm constructively dissatisfied with our performance… We lost on price.” Total IRS filers were down ~30 basis points this season, a roughly 2-million-unit shortfall that hit the category leader.

Consumer — Credit Karma $631M+15%7%

Recovered and compounding. Of the 15% growth, personal loans contributed 9 points, auto insurance 5 points and home loans 1 point. Credit Karma is increasingly the front door to tax: a 54% increase in filers who start in Credit Karma this year (up 25 points), with simple filers able to have up to 80% of their taxes done before they even open TurboTax. Average revenue per user is ~30% higher for customers using both TurboTax and Credit Karma.

Consumer — ProTax$278M~0%3%
Total net revenue$8,558M+10%100%
Notes Consumer (TurboTax + Credit Karma + ProTax) was $5,273M, +8%. Q3 is the seasonal peak: non-GAAP operating margin was 54.7% in the quarter. Segment operating margins remain extraordinary: Global Business Solutions ~77%, Consumer ~81%.
SourceQ3 FY26 Fact Sheet · Q3 2026 Earnings Call Transcript [2] [3]

1.3Key Performance Indicators

  • Mid-market is the fastest-growing engine — QuickBooks Advanced plus Intuit Enterprise Suite online ecosystem revenue grew ~38% into a nearly $90bn addressable market.

    Intuit Enterprise Suite contracts grew 37% quarter-over-quarter, and the company is scaling its direct sales team ~30% with improving productivity. The strategic pivot: selling an end-to-end "control tower" platform to land new-to-franchise mid-market customers and to get accountants to bring their clients on. Management calls mid-market an AI-native platform with “a lot of headroom.”

  • TurboTax Live now over half of TurboTax revenue — the assisted category, 88% of the total tax opportunity, is where Intuit is structurally advantaged.

    The total tax market is ~$42bn, of which ~$37bn is assisted (people paying an expert) and only ~$5bn is do-it-yourself. Intuit's penetration of the assisted category is still low. The local-expert strategy is working: 36% of TurboTax Live customers acquired through local channels were new to TurboTax. Sasan: “customers spend over 7x on people to help them make decisions versus just software and code.”

  • Total online payment volume grew 30% as money moves to the center of the QuickBooks platform.

    Volume growth excluding Bill Pay was 18%, so Bill Pay adoption is adding meaningfully. Intuit is layering on credit: Buy Now, Pay Later embedded in QuickBooks and a new Intuit Business Credit Card, widening the money portfolio (one of the three Big Bets growing north of 30%).

  • $300bn total addressable market, ~6% penetration — management's framing of the long runway across consumer and business finance.
  • Three "Big Bets" all growing north of 30%: assisted tax, the money / mid-market payments portfolio, and mid-market.
SourceQ3 2026 Earnings Call Transcript [3]
Part 2

Moat

2.1Industry Overview & Growth

  • Two large, structurally growing markets: consumer tax preparation and small-and-mid-business financial software (accounting, payments, payroll). Both are recurring, compliance-driven, and sticky.
  • The category is being reshaped by AI on two fronts: as a threat (large language models could automate simple tax and bookkeeping) and as a tool (Intuit embeds AI agents to do more of the work and widen its funnel).
  • The assisted shift is the key trend: 88% of tax spend goes to human help, and Intuit is the only player combining software, data and an expert network at scale.
SourceQ3 2026 Earnings Call Transcript [3]

2.2Qualitative Competitor Analysis

Generative AI / LLMsThe disruption fear
The bear thesis: chatbots disintermediate tax prep and bookkeeping, collapsing the need for paid software.

Management's rebuttal is specific. On tax: “the 88% of our TAM that go to somebody else to do their taxes for them has nothing to do with how good software gets. This is all about confidence… they want to delegate the liability of these very high-stake decisions.” On business: “you can't run your business with an LLM because you're managing your books… your payroll and accuracy and compliance of doing that matters.”

Intuit also turns the models into a funnel, partnering with Anthropic and OpenAI so high-intent new businesses start with basic tasks (invoicing) and graduate onto QuickBooks. The structural question for the thesis is whether that holds as models get more capable.

H&R Block, FreeTaxUSA, Cash App TaxesTax rivals
Assisted (H&R Block) and free / low-cost DIY (FreeTaxUSA, Cash App Taxes) competitors that pressure the price-sensitive end.

This is where Intuit actually felt pressure this season: it lost share among sub-$50,000 DIY filers who “care about price” and are willing to accept a worse experience to pay less. The planned fix is a value-based model (a free SKU for the simplest filers, paid tiers as complexity rises) plus monetizing those users beyond tax through Credit Karma, where it has a structural edge rivals lack.

Xero, Sage, FreshBooks, BillSMB accounting
Established accounting and payments competitors to QuickBooks. Intuit's edge is the integrated platform (accounting plus payments plus payroll plus capital) and the accountant network, which it is deepening with the new Accountant Suite.
SourceQ3 2026 Earnings Call Transcript [3]

2.3Moat Analysis

Moat typeStrengthEvidence
Switching costsStrongAccounting, payroll, payments and tax data are mission-critical and embedded in a business's operations; migrating carries real risk and disruption.
Data / network effectsStrong~10M businesses and ~1M accountants feed AI agents; accountants recommend QuickBooks and bring clients on, reinforcing the loop.
Brand / trustStrongFour decades of accuracy, compliance and security; "customers buy confidence." TurboTax and QuickBooks are category-defining brands.
Scale / intangiblesStrong80% gross margin and ~37% FCF margin reflect platform economics; the expert network is hard to replicate at scale.
Regulatory / liabilityMediumTax and compliance complexity favors trusted incumbents; customers delegate liability. But governmental encroachment (free-file programs) is a tail risk.
AI substitutionThe live threatGenerative AI could erode the simplest DIY and bookkeeping tasks. Intuit's defense is confidence, compliance, and embedding AI itself.
Read The moat is wide and multi-sourced (switching costs + data + brand + scale), which is why returns on capital employed sit at 23% and margins are elite. The entire valuation debate is the bottom row: whether AI substitution is a slow tool-adoption story (Intuit's view) or a fast disintermediation story (the market's current price).
SourceINTU-DOSSIER.md · Q3 2026 Earnings Call Transcript [1] [3]
Part 3

Management

3.1Leadership & Strategy

  • Sasan Goodarzi — Chairman and CEO since January 2019. A 20-plus-year Intuit veteran, candid in calls and a disciplined operator. Sandeep Aujla is CFO.
  • 17% workforce reduction announced with Q3 — a deliberate restructuring to become "faster, leaner and more focused," with the majority of savings flowing to the bottom line.

    Sasan was explicit that this is not an AI story: “This was not about AI.” The drivers were fewer management layers, fewer coordination-heavy roles, de-duplication after integrating TurboTax and Credit Karma, and rightsizing Mailchimp. The framing was a “day 1” mentality: “replacing the roof while the sun is shining.”

    The capital logic, per CFO Sandeep Aujla: unlike the 2024 cuts, “the majority of the cost reductions we do expect to flow to the bottom line.” The charge is ~$300M. Management reaffirmed EPS growth, GAAP and non-GAAP, “north of 15%” over the coming years.

  • Management is candid about misses: on the low-end tax season, Sasan said plainly “we lost on price” rather than blaming the macro — the kind of honesty that builds credibility.
SourceQ3 2026 Earnings Call Transcript [3]

3.2Capital Allocation

LeverRecent actionRead
Buybacks $1.6B repurchased in Q3, more than double a year earlier; first 3 quarters up over 60% YoYLeaning in at the lows

Sandeep: “We are leaning meaningfully into share repurchases this year… This reflects both our strong conviction in our long-term trajectory and our belief that our shares represent compelling value at current levels.” Intuit aims to be in the market every quarter. With the stock near multi-year lows, buybacks at ~10.7x free cash flow are highly accretive.

DividendQuarterly dividend raised 15% to $1.20/shareGrowing, well covered
Restructuring17% headcount cut; majority of savings to the bottom lineMargin + EPS discipline
M&A / MailchimpRightsizing Mailchimp for cash flow rather than selling into a weak software marketPragmatic, value-focused
Owner-friendly through the drawdown Buying back more stock as the price falls, raising the dividend, and cutting costs to expand margins is the textbook response of a confident, aligned management team. The watch item is stock-based comp (~$2bn), which the buyback must keep absorbing for the share count to keep shrinking.
SourceQ3 2026 Earnings Call Transcript · Q3 FY26 Fact Sheet [2] [3]
Part 4

Key Ratios

4.1Growth Rates (per share)

Metric1Y3Y CAGR5Y CAGR10Y CAGR
FCF Growth (Per Share) %28.70%18.60%18.40%18.50%
Revenue Growth (Per Share) %16.60%14.10%17.80%16.40%
EPS without NRI Growth %18.40%19.40%20.60%21.80%
The growth is not broken Unlike a typical de-rated stock, Intuit's growth is intact: revenue per share compounded ~18% over five years, EPS ~21%, and even the trailing year shows FCF/share up ~29% and EPS up ~18%. The ~60% share-price fall is almost entirely multiple compression, not a deterioration in the business.
SourceGuruFocus snapshot (2026-05-20) [4]

4.2Margins

MetricCurrent5Y Median
Gross Margin %79.96%
Operating Margin %27.47%23.66%
FCF Margin %36.87%32.30%
Elite and expanding FCF margin ~37% (above the ~32% five-year median) and a gross margin near 80% put Intuit among the best businesses in the universe. Segment operating margins are higher still: Global Business Solutions ~77% and Consumer ~81%, with the gap to company margin reflecting platform-level investment. The 17% restructuring is aimed squarely at expanding company-level margin from here.
SourceGuruFocus snapshot · Q3 FY26 Fact Sheet [4] [2]

4.3Capital Efficiency

MetricCurrent5Y Median
ROIC % 14.55%11.97%

Why ROIC understates the franchise. Reported ROIC (~14.5%) is held down by acquisition goodwill: Credit Karma (~$8bn) and Mailchimp (~$12bn) sit on the balance sheet at full cost (Goodwill-to-Asset 0.36). Strip the deal goodwill and the operating businesses earn far higher returns — visible in ROCE of 23% and 1-year and 3-year incremental returns on capital (ROIIC) of ~45% and ~27%.

The weak point in this picture is the 5-year ROIIC of ~8%, which reflects the Mailchimp acquisition diluting incremental returns. That is the legitimate version of the "capital allocation" critique: organic returns are superb, but the largest deal has not yet earned its cost of capital.

ROCE %23.11%15.59%
ROE %23.19%16.60%
SourceGuruFocus snapshot (2026-05-20) [4]

4.4Balance Sheet & Returns to Shareholders

MetricCurrent
Debt-to-Equity0.33
Cash-to-Debt1.22
Current Ratio1.45
Interest Coverage23.47
Dividends per Share (TTM)$4.64
Stock Based Compensation (mm)$2,039M
Free Cash Flow (mm)$7,715M
Net cash, with stock comp the one caveat Cash and investments (~$6.8bn) modestly exceed debt (~$6.2bn), interest coverage is ~23x, and free cash flow is ~$7.7bn. The watch item is stock-based comp at ~$2bn: it must be continually offset by buybacks for the share count to keep falling, which so far it is.
SourceGuruFocus snapshot · Q3 2026 Earnings Call Transcript [4] [3]
Part 5

Valuation

5.1Current Multiples vs History

MultipleCurrent10yr medianRead
P / FCF10.7x31.8x~1/3 of its normal multiple
EV / FCF10.3xNet cash narrows EV
EV / EBIT13.1xCheap on operating earnings
P / E (no NRI)12.9xMulti-year low
FCF Yield9.50%High for the quality
A quality compounder at a value multiple ~10.7x free cash flow and ~12.9x earnings, with a PEG ratio of 0.76 and a ~9.5% free cash flow yield, is a valuation normally reserved for no-growth businesses. Intuit grew revenue per share ~18% over five years. The gap between the multiple and the growth is the opportunity, if the AI thesis is wrong.
SourceGuruFocus snapshot (2026-05-20) [4]

5.2Reverse DCF — What the Market Prices In

Two-stage model, 10% discount rate, 20-year horizon, off trailing FCF/share of $27.80. Current price ~$296.76.

StageGrowth rateYearsPresent value
Growth stage~3%1–10~$194
Terminal stage~2%11–20~$103
Implied price~$297
What this means At ~$297, the market is pricing roughly 3% annual free cash flow growth for a decade, then ~2% terminal. For a business that compounded free cash flow per share ~18% a year over five years and is guiding mid-teens EPS growth, this is an extraordinary collapse of expectations — the market is effectively underwriting the AI bear case in full.
SourceINTU-DOSSIER.md · GuruFocus snapshot [1] [4]

5.3DCF Scenarios

ScenarioGrowth yrs 1–10TerminalFair valuevs $296.76
Market implied3%2%~$297
Bear0%2%~$243-18%
Base9.5%2%~$450+52%
Bull14%2%~$609+105%
Asymmetry The bear case ($243, zero growth for a decade) is only -18% from today, because the market has already priced near-zero growth. The base case ($450, 9.5% growth, roughly half the historical rate) is +52%, and the bull ($609, 14%) is +105%. You are not paying for growth here, so any growth at all re-rates the stock. Continued buybacks at this multiple add per-share value not in any scenario.
Try your own scenario

Two-stage DCF, 20-year horizon. Edit any input and the fair value recomputes live. Refresh the page to return to the base case.

Live price $296.76
Fair value per share $450
vs live price +52%

Defaults: 9.5% growth yrs 1–10, 2% terminal yrs 11–20, 10% discount, $27.80 trailing FCF/share. The 9.5% base is roughly half Intuit's five-year FCF/share growth, a deliberate haircut for the AI risk. Live price refreshes from Yahoo on page load.

SourceINTU-DOSSIER.md · GuruFocus snapshot [1] [4]
Part 6

Risks

6.1Red flags, ranked by severity

  • AI disintermediationSeverity: high. The core reason for the ~60% de-rating: the fear that large language models automate tax prep and bookkeeping and erode the need for paid software. Unproven either way, and the single biggest swing factor on the thesis.

    Management's defense rests on customer psychology and mission-criticality, not on software being better. Sasan: assisted tax “has nothing to do with how good software gets. This is all about confidence,” and businesses “can't run… with an LLM” because accuracy and compliance are non-negotiable. Intuit is also co-opting the models via Anthropic and OpenAI partnerships to feed its funnel.

    What to watch: any hard evidence of share loss to AI-native tools (not just narrative), and whether the August platform launch with consumption-based AI pricing lands. The bull case needs the assisted and mid-market engines to keep growing >30% as proof the moat holds.

  • Low-end DIY tax share lossSeverity: medium. Intuit lost share among price-sensitive sub-$50,000 filers this season ("we lost on price"). That DIY segment is ~12% of the tax market, but the optics fed the bear narrative.

    The fix is a shift from complexity-based to value-based pricing: a free SKU for the simplest filers, paid tiers as complexity rises, plus monetizing those users beyond tax through Credit Karma (where ARPU is ~30% higher for dual users). Sasan stressed this is “all about being priced right… none of this has anything to do with AI.”

    What to watch: whether the model change stops the share bleed next tax season while protecting the high-ARPU assisted mix.

  • Tax-season seasonality and IRS filing trendsSeverity: medium. A huge share of Consumer revenue and margin lands in one quarter, and total IRS filers fell ~30 basis points this season, a ~2-million-unit shortfall that hit the category leader.

    A weak filing season compresses the most profitable quarter, and the timing of manual filers is partly outside Intuit's control. The structural offset is the shift to assisted (TurboTax Live), which carries far higher ARPU and is growing 36%, plus Credit Karma becoming a year-round engagement engine rather than a tax-only one.

  • Mailchimp underperformanceSeverity: medium-low. Mailchimp revenue is down slightly year-over-year and is being rightsized; it is the visible drag inside the otherwise strong Global Business Solutions segment.

    Management is running Mailchimp for cash flow rather than selling it, judging that “the turns of revenue you can get from a third party just aren't there right now” in the current software market. The plan is to keep improving churn and SMS/mid-market adoption while cutting cost to match the growth profile, like the Desktop playbook.

  • Acquisition goodwill and high stock compSeverity: medium-low. Reported ROIC (~14.5%) is dragged by Credit Karma and Mailchimp goodwill, 5-year incremental returns are weak, and stock-based comp runs ~$2bn a year.

    The organic franchise earns far higher returns (ROCE 23%, 1- and 3-year ROIIC ~45% and ~27%); the drag is specifically the Mailchimp deal not yet earning its cost of capital. On stock comp, the share count is still falling because buybacks more than offset dilution, but that has to continue for per-share value to compound.

  • Governmental encroachment in taxSeverity: low-medium. Free-file or government-run tax programs are a recurring tail risk to the DIY tax business, though they do not touch the assisted category that is now the growth driver.
SourceQ3 2026 Earnings Call Transcript · Q3 FY26 Fact Sheet [2] [3]
Verdict

Buy · the de-rating has outrun the fundamentals

Last reviewed Jun 7, 2026 after Q3 FY2026 results · Next review ~Aug 2026 (Q4 FY2026)
References

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