Universe / WISE
LSE : WISE · OTC : WPLCF · ADR : WIZEY · Financials · Cross-Border Payments Infrastructure

Wise plc

Founded 2011 · HQ London · 18.9M active customers · £181.7bn FY26 cross-border volume · 0.57% of a £32T TAM · Last report update May 25, 2026 (through Q4 FY26 Trading Update)

Live quote · Yahoo Finance
Price £9.02 · today
Market cap $12,787M ~1.1bn shares (broadly flat; 25m buyback offsets options)
Enterprise value N/A Net cash; customer balances £29.4bn separate
Overall score 79 Strong · out of 100
Score breakdown
79/100
Strong
Moat
18/20
Scale Economies Shared compounder: 70+ regulatory licenses, 8 direct payment-system connections, 70% word-of-mouth acquisition. Each take-rate cut widens the cost moat against banks and challengers.
Management
17/20
Founder-CEO Kristo Käärmann with ~£4bn personal stake, 10-year framing, said-vs-delivered near-perfect. Only smudge: a small dual-listing timing slip and the 2021 HMRC late-filing fine.
Business risk
15/20
Take-rate cuts are strategic, not pressured. Stablecoins reframed as opportunity. Live risks: regulatory complexity, rate-sensitive above-1% interest income, US OCC charter still pending.
Key ratios
17/20
Underlying income +18% (+24% in Q4 FY26), accelerating every quarter of FY26. ROIC ~99% per portfolio data. -3 because reported PBT margin was compressed by design from 22% to ~16%.
Valuation
12/20
~43x Underlying PBT and ~25.5x P/E at snapshot — near the top of the universe's multiple range, but the market is pricing ~25% PBT growth for a decade and Wise is delivering 18–24%. Bear (15%) = -45%. Base (20%) = ~0%. Bull (30%) = +40%. Hold-not-buy at current price; the growth has to keep printing. Score moves inversely with price.
0–39 Poor 40–59 Weak 60–74 Average 75–89 Strong 90–100 Exceptional

One-line thesis: Wise is building the global infrastructure monopoly for cross-border money movement using the Scale Economies Shared playbook — deliberately cutting take-rates to widen the cost moat, growing 18–24% on underlying income at 0.57% market share of a £32 trillion TAM. The business is exceptional; the price is full.

Part 1

Business Overview

1.1Business Model

  • Cross-border payments infrastructure founded 2011 by Estonian engineer Kristo Käärmann after he paid ~5% in hidden fees wiring GBP to EUR. Wise replaces correspondent banks with local-currency pools and matches payments internally — money never crosses a border.
  • Three product layers. Wise Account (personal), Wise Business (SMBs), and Wise Platform — the B2B infrastructure play where banks and fintechs embed Wise rails into their own products. Platform is the highest-leverage growth lane.
  • Direct national payment system access vs correspondent banking: each direct integration cuts cost and time per transfer. First non-bank in UK Faster Payments (~2017) and Japan's Zengin (Nov 2025). Backed by 70+ regulatory licenses across 160+ countries.
  • Scale Economies Shared playbook. Voluntary take-rate cuts widen the cost moat: lower price → more volume → more scale → lower unit cost. PBT margin is structurally capped at 13–16%; anything above gets reinvested into more cuts.
  • Word-of-mouth flywheel. Cheapest provider wins referrals; referrals lower CAC; lower CAC funds more take-rate cuts. The loop self-reinforces with scale.
  • Customer holdings as a deposit-like asset. Users park balances at Wise; the company earns interest on the float but only the first 1% of yield counts toward Underlying PBT. The rest is excluded from the valuation lens.
  • Revenue diversification beyond pure transfer fees — card spending, interest on balances, asset products. Cushions take-rate compression in the core line.
  • Why Underlying PBT, not FCF. Reported FCF is distorted by customer balances flowing through the business; Underlying PBT is the cleaner profit lens. All valuation in Part 5 uses it.
SourceWISE-DOSSIER.md §1 [1]

1.2Revenue Sources

LineFY2025FY2026YoY
Active customers15.6m18.9m+21%
Cross-border volume£145bn£181.7bn+25%
Customer holdings~£21.5bn£29.4bn+37%
Underlying income£1,362m£1,609m+18% (+19% cc)
Cross-border take-rate (avg)~56bps~52bps-4bps (by design)
Instant transfers (Q4)65%75%+10pp
Implied Underlying PBT~£300m~£257m-14% (deliberate)
Q4 FY26 detailQ4 FY25Q4 FY26YoY
Active customers9.29m11.29m+22%
Cross-border volume£39.1bn£49.4bn+26% (+27% cc)
Underlying income£350.4m£435.3m+24%
Card and other revenue£100.9m£130.2m+29%
Cross-border take-rate0.53%0.51%-2bps
Acceleration, not deceleration Underlying income growth in FY26: Q1 +11%, Q2 +15%, Q3 +21%, Q4 +24%. Every quarter of FY26 was faster than the last. The H1 FY25 take-rate reset is now fully lapped and volume growth (25–27%) is compounding on a larger base.
SourceWISE-DOSSIER.md §2 & §5 · WiseplcQ4FY26TradingUpdate(2).pdf [1] [3]

1.3Key Performance Indicators

  • Personal vs business split: 10.7m personal active (+21%) and 572K business active (+26%; volumes +35%). Personal scales for revenue; business scales for volume and stickiness.
  • Wise Platform now ~5% of total volume (H1 FY26), up from 4% six months earlier and 3% a year earlier. Targeted at 10% medium-term, 50% long-term — the deepest B2B optionality.
  • 8 direct payment system integrations as of H1 FY26 (vs 6 a year earlier): UK Faster Payments, SEPA, Pix (Brazil), Zengin (Japan), NPP (Australia), InstaPay (Philippines), plus others. Australia going direct lifted instant transfers there from 24% to 83%.
  • 75% of transfers instant (<20 seconds) in Q4 FY26, up from 65% a year earlier. Instant transfers correlate with retention.
  • NPS 69 — exceptional for financial services (industry average is 0–30). Direct read on word-of-mouth durability.
  • 70% of new customer acquisition is word-of-mouth (near-zero CAC). Marketing payback held at 6 months even as H1 FY26 paid-marketing spend rose 59%.
  • 0.57% of a £32 trillion TAM. 5% personal market share, ~1% SMB share. Penetration is the central long-term reason to own the stock.
  • 25m share buyback program announced to offset employee option dilution; ~50% completed by H1 FY26 close.
SourceWISE-DOSSIER.md §5 & §7 [1]
Part 2

Moat

2.1Industry Overview & Growth

  • Cross-border payments is a £32 trillion annual TAM dominated by correspondent banking. Traditional cost: 3–7% all-in fees buried in FX markup, 2–5 day settlement, no upfront disclosure.
  • Wise penetrates by holding local-currency pools in dozens of countries and matching internally. 75% of transfers now arrive in under 20 seconds.
  • Regulators increasingly let non-banks into payment rails. First non-bank in UK Faster Payments (~2017); first non-bank in Japan's Zengin (Nov 2025); Canada Payments membership Jan 2026; UAE Central Bank licence approved.
  • Stablecoins solve the easy problem (USD-to-USD). The hard problem (GBP-to-BRL, EUR-to-JPY) is exactly the multi-currency local-payment-system rails Wise built. If stablecoins grow, Wise is the regulated on/off ramp.
  • Platform is where the TAM expands. Embedding Wise rails into ~4,000 US banks and global enterprises turns Wise from a consumer brand into the underlying plumbing of cross-border banking.
SourceWISE-DOSSIER.md §1 & §5 [1]

2.2Qualitative Competitor Analysis

Correspondent banks (HSBC, Citi, JPM, etc.)Incumbents
The legacy rails Wise is replacing. Built for institutional flows, not retail. Cost structure (3–7% all-in via FX markup) cannot match Wise's 51bps take-rate. Many are now Platform partners (UniCredit, Raiffeisen, Standard Chartered, Itáu) rather than competitors — they buy Wise rails instead of building.
Revolut (private)Tier 1
Closest consumer-fintech competitor in EMEA. Broader product surface (crypto, brokerage, banking), but less depth in payment-system integrations and licenses. Lacks the Platform B2B layer.
Western Union, Remitly, WorldRemitNiche
Remittance-focused with retail agent networks. Higher cost structure, slower settlement. Lose share in every market Wise enters direct.
Stablecoin issuers (Circle, Tether)Adjacent
Solve USD-to-USD movement; do not solve multi-currency local-payment-rail conversion. Wise positions itself as the regulated on/off ramp into local currencies and is partnering rather than competing.
SourceWISE-DOSSIER.md §3 [1]

2.3Moat Analysis

Moat typeStrengthEvidence
Low-cost producer (SES)Strong67bps→51bps take-rate over 2yrs is a deliberate price weapon. Each cut compounds the cost gap vs banks and challengers.
Intangible assets (licenses)Strong70+ regulatory licenses across 160+ countries; multi-year regulatory investment that cannot be replicated quickly.
Scale / infrastructureStrong8 direct payment-system connections; first non-bank in UK Faster Payments, Japan Zengin. Australia direct lifted instant from 24% to 83%.
Switching costsMediumMulti-currency holdings, local account details (UK sort code, EU IBAN, US routing) and recurring use of card / interest. Holdings £29.4bn signals deep stickiness.
Network effectsMedium70% word-of-mouth acquisition is a real demand-side network. Platform is a B2B network growing 3× group average.
Regulatory complexityMedium160+ country compliance burden is its own moat against AI-native challengers and new entrants.
SourceWISE-DOSSIER.md §1 & §5 · WiseH1FY26AnalystPresentation.pdf [1] [4]

2.4Additional Moat Considerations

Selected from the 26-item framework. Items shown are the strongest supporting points and the most material concerns for Wise specifically.

YesFounder-led with skin in the gameKristo Käärmann co-founder & CEO; ~£4bn personal stake
YesScale Economies Shared67bps→51bps; every efficiency gain returned to customers
YesWord-of-mouth acquisition70% of new customers; 6-month paid-marketing payback
YesHigh ROIC~99% per portfolio data; asset-light infrastructure
YesLong runway0.57% of £32T TAM; 2% share = ~3.5× from here with no market growth
YesRevenue diversification41% of underlying income is non-cross-border (cards, interest, asset products)
YesCustomer-funded balance sheet£29.4bn customer holdings (+37%) trusted to the platform
ModRate-sensitive interest incomeAbove-1% interest £206m H1 FY26, fading as yields decline
ModRegulatory examination riskMMET consent order $4.2m (Jul 2025) resolved; future exams possible
ModFounder governance history2021 HMRC late-filing fine resolved; persists in some ESG screens
NoMargin of safety on valuation~43× Underlying PBT — highest in portfolio; no cushion
NoCapped explicit margin band13–16% Underlying PBT ceiling by design — current earnings look thin
SourceWISE-DOSSIER.md §5 & §6 · Meta analysis from poorcharlie.io.txt (framework) [1] [8]
Part 3

Management

3.1Leadership & Tenure

  • Kristo Käärmann — co-founder, CEO, director since 2011. Estonian engineer who built Wise after paying 5% in hidden fees to wire money. Personal stake ~£4bn — the largest skin-in-the-game founder profile in the universe.
  • Emmanuel Thomassin — CFO since October 2024, brought in as a “first hire” CFO with capacity-to-invest explicitly stated as a priority.
  • Founder voting control: Käärmann holds 186,078,489 Class A + 186,022,590 Class B Shares (Class B carries 9 votes each), giving 1,868,079,459 voting rights = 49.3% of total voting rights. Class B Shares are non-transferable, non-tradable, with no dividend rights — pure long-term lock-in.
  • Co-founder block: Notorious Ω (Taavet Hinrikus / Hooi Ling Tan related vehicle) holds 353,682,539 voting rights = 13.1%. Combined with Käärmann, founder-aligned voting power exceeds 62%.
  • NED skin-in-the-game: Alastair Rampell 38,549,643 Class A (via a16z funds + direct); David Wells (Chair) 96,720 Class A + 600,000 legacy options; Elizabeth Chambers 96,720 Class A; Terri Duhon 9,213 connected. NEDs are paid fees only, no LTIP participation.
  • Equity comp structure: Hybrid LTIP for CFO — 200% of salary in performance shares + 200% restricted shares, 3-year performance vesting (FY26+: weighted 40% relative TSR vs FTSE 100, 20% volume CAGR, 20% underlying PBT margin 13–16%, 20% NPS), 2-year post-vest holding. Executive shareholding requirement: 300% of salary within 5 years. Käärmann abstains from all variable pay.
  • FY25 insider transactions: David Wells exercised + sold 223,000 legacy options on 19 Jul 2024 (strike £0.62, sale £7.87) and sold 100,000 Class A on 18 Jul 2024; Rampell received 257,840 Class A distributed from a16z funds on 4 Apr 2025. No Käärmann sales disclosed.
  • Ten-year framing. Käärmann talks about decisions in terms of what they mean for the company in the next 10 years; never quarterly. “We're building the network for the world's money” is the verbatim phrase repeated on every call.
  • Price as mission, not lever. Käärmann (H1 FY26): “We amazingly see this working. We see more volume even coming up in the short term, let alone this economic moat that we're building.”
  • Historical: HMRC fined Käärmann publicly in 2021 for a late self-assessment filing. Resolved; not currently operational, but lingers in some ESG screens.
SourceWISE-DOSSIER.md §3 · WiseFY2025AnnualReportAccounts.pdf pp.103–117 · Wise plc (WIZEY) Q2 2026 Earnings C.md [1] [5] [6]

3.2Capital Allocation History

No major M&A history — Wise has grown organically. Capital return is via buybacks (anti-dilution) plus reinvestment in pricing, hiring, marketing, and the dual listing.

ActionYearStrategic roleOutcome
Direct LSE listing (no IPO)2021Public market access; avoid banker spreadSuccessful direct listing
Take-rate reset to 13–16% margin targetFY25SES playbook — price cuts to widen moatVolume +25% offset rate cut; income +18%
25m share buyback programFY26Offset employee option dilution~50% complete by H1 close
Marketing spend +59% H1 FY26FY26Brand reinvestment (Canada, NZ, US, UK)Customer adds +14%; payback held at 6 months
Nasdaq dual listing2026US institutional access; Platform credibilityApproved Jul 2025; expected May 11, 2026 (slight delay)
No dividendsongoingReinvest at high ROICCorrect math for growth-stage compounder
Track record Capital return is anti-dilutive only; the bulk of capital goes back into the SES flywheel. Margins are explicitly capped at 13–16% — anything above 16% gets reinvested. Cleanest capital allocation philosophy in the universe.
SourceWISE-DOSSIER.md §3 & §5 [1]

3.3Said vs Delivered

PromiseWhenOutcomeConsistent?
Reinvest FY25 margin surplus from 22% back to 13–16%Owners Day Apr 25FY26 guided ~16% (top of range); H1 FY26 came in at 16.3%Yes
Take-rate cuts will drive volume that offsets revenue impactH1 FY25Volume +25% FY26 on take-rate down ~4bps; income still +18%Yes
Underlying income to grow 15–20% cc mid-termOngoingFY26 +19% cc; Q4 FY26 +24% — accelerating into rangeYes / beating
Platform 10% volume medium-term, 50% long-termOwners Day 20253% → 4% → 5% over three consecutive reporting periodsOn track
Complete Nasdaq dual listing around Q2 FY27Jun 2025Guided May 11, 2026 — slipped from original Q4 FY26 guideSlight delay
MMET examination resolved; remediation on trackH1 FY26$4.2m consent order paid; no further escalationYes
Marketing payback 6 months despite +59% spendH1 FY26Customer adds +14% H1 FY26 vs prior year; Australia CPA trending downYes
No material price adjustments in H2 FY26 — reset doneH1 FY26Q3/Q4 take-rate held at 52bps then ticked down 1bp to 51bpsYes
Verdict Käärmann and Thomassin say what they do and do what they say. The only near-miss is the dual listing timing slip, which is execution rather than strategy. The 13–16% margin band is being delivered exactly as guided despite the deliberate ~5pp compression.
SourceWISE-DOSSIER.md §4 · WISEplcH1FY26Results.pdf [1] [4]
Part 4

Key Ratios

4.1Growth Rates

Metric1Y3Y CAGR5Y CAGR10Y CAGR
FCF Growth (Per Share) %56.80%11.30%24.70%0%
Revenue Growth (Per Share) %12.50%45.80%44.20%0%
EPS without NRI Growth %-5.50%131.90%102.20%0%
Standout — Revenue compounding 44.20% over 5Y Revenue per share 5Y CAGR of 44.20% is exceptional (>20% benchmark) and the 3Y rate of 45.80% shows the Käärmann-era scale-economies-shared engine is still accelerating, not maturing.
Watch — 1Y EPS −5.50% reset Trailing-year EPS fell 5.50% as lower customer-balance interest income compressed reported earnings; underlying volumes still compounded, but it explains the optical stall against the 102.20% 5Y CAGR.
SourcePortfolio snapshot 30.05.2026.txt (GuruFocus export) [9]

4.2Margins

MetricCurrent5Y Growth Rate5Y Median
Gross Margin %72.85%3.40%N/A
Operating Margin %27.47%39.10%15.65%
FCF Margin %283.23%N/A396.54%
Note — FCF Margin Distortion WISE's reported FCF includes customer-balance interest income (£29bn+ in client funds) inflating the headline FCF margin to 283%. Use Underlying PBT for valuation, not FCF. See dossier guidance.
Standout — Operating margin +39.10% over 5Y Operating margin expanded from a 5Y median of 15.65% to 27.47% today, a structural mix shift on the back of fixed-cost leverage; the gain is real even after stripping the customer-balance FCF distortion.
SourcePortfolio snapshot 30.05.2026.txt [9]

4.3Capital Efficiency

MetricCurrent5Y Median
ROIC %98.82%33.80%
ROCE %34.79%26.52%
ROE %29.02%22.33%
Cash Conversion Ratio13.7234.31

ROIIC % (Return on Incremental Invested Capital)

PeriodROIIC %
1-Year-24.69%
3-Year201.09%
5-Year129.10%
Standout — ROIC 98.82% with 3Y ROIIC 201.09% Current ROIC of 98.82% sits nearly triple its own 5Y median of 33.80%, and 3Y ROIIC of 201.09% is the highest in the universe; this is what an asset-light payments rail looks like once scale kicks in.
Watch — 1Y ROIIC −24.69% The one-year ROIIC turned negative because the latest year's incremental capital met a lower interest-income tailwind; over any 3Y+ window the marginal returns are still extraordinary.
SourcePortfolio snapshot 30.05.2026.txt [9]

4.4Balance Sheet Health

MetricCurrent
Debt-to-Equity0.21
Cash-to-Debt49.38
Interest Coverage30.38
Current Ratio1.08
Standout — Fortress balance sheet Cash-to-Debt of 49.38 (vs >2 fortress threshold) and interest coverage of 30.38 put WISE in the safest bucket; D/E 0.21 is conservative for a regulated financial.
SourcePortfolio snapshot 30.05.2026.txt [9]

4.5Shareholder Returns & Other Metrics

MetricCurrent
1-Year Dividend Growth Rate (Per Share) %N/A
3-Year Dividend Growth Rate (Per Share) %N/A
Dividends per Share (TTM)£0
1-Year Share Buyback RatioN/A
3-Year Share Buyback Ratio0.50
5-Year Share Buyback Ratio-0.50
Goodwill-to-Asset %0
Stock Based Compensation (mm)£57.20M
Free Cash Flow (mm)£5,293.50M
Watch — SBC ratio is misleading here SBC of £57.20M against headline FCF of £5,293.50M looks like a clean 1.1%, but the FCF denominator is inflated by customer balances; benchmark SBC against Underlying PBT instead.
Standout — Zero goodwill, organic compounder Goodwill-to-Asset of 0 confirms WISE has built its rail organically rather than through M&A; pair that with the 3Y buyback ratio of 0.50 and the float discipline reads cleaner than any acquisitive peer.
SourcePortfolio snapshot 30.05.2026.txt [9]
Part 5

Valuation

5.1Current Multiples vs Context

MultipleCurrent10yr medianRead
P / FCF1.9x2.3xCustomer balances inflate reported FCF
EV / FCF-1.0xCustomer balances net against EV
EV / EBIT-9.5xNegative on customer-balance treatment
P / E (no NRI)25.5xCleaner lens; still cheaper than Underlying PBT view
FCF Yield54.86%Inflated by customer deposit inflows
Why Underlying PBT, not FCF Wise holds £29.4bn of customer balances. Customer deposits flowing in (~£2.4bn in H1 FY26) inflate reported “cash from operations” and crush EV in a way unrelated to earning power. Every FCF- and EV-based multiple above is therefore distorted. Underlying PBT — revenue plus first 1% interest on customer balances minus operating costs — is the durable, non-cyclical earning measure management has anchored to. Price / Underlying PBT is ~43x; that is the only valuation lens that matters for Wise.
SourceWISE-DOSSIER.md §8 [1]

5.2Reverse DCF — What the Market Prices In

Two-stage model on Underlying PBT, 10% discount rate, 20-year horizon. Underlying PBT/share ~£0.20 (£257m / ~1.3bn diluted shares). Current price ~£9.02.

StageGrowth assumptionTerminalImplied value
Growth stage (yrs 1–10)~25%
Terminal stage (yrs 11+)3%
Market-implied price~£9.00
What this means The market is pricing ~25% Underlying PBT growth for a decade then 3% terminal. Underlying income is currently +18% (Q4 +24%) at a 13–16% margin band that caps PBT growth at income growth. The implied 25% is at the high end of current trajectory — achievable but leaves zero margin of safety.
SourceWISE-DOSSIER.md §8 [1]

5.3DCF Scenarios

ScenarioGrowth yrs 1–10TerminalFair valuevs £9.02
Market implied25%3%~£9.00
Bear (deceleration)15%3%~£5.50-39%
Base20%3%~£7.20-20%
Bull30%3%~£11.80+31%
Asymmetry skews negative at current price Bear case: -39%. Bull case: +31%. Base: -20%. Unlike most positions in the universe, the spread skews negative at recent levels. Cost basis of £6.90 (35x Underlying PBT) gives embedded value; the thesis to own is the runway (0.57% → 2% market share is ~3.5×) and the SES flywheel widening the moat each quarter, not multiple expansion.
SourceWISE-DOSSIER.md §8 [1]
Part 6

Risks

6.1Red flags, ranked by severity

  • Premium valuation with no margin of safetySeverity: medium (structural, ongoing). Price/Underlying PBT ~43x on FY26 implied Underlying PBT of ~£257m — the highest multiple in the portfolio. Premium is earned (24% income growth, 0.57% market share, accelerating flywheel) but 43x leaves no room for error. If underlying income growth decelerates from 20%+ to 15%, the stock reprices significantly. Cost basis of £6.90 (35x) gives embedded value; adding higher is paying for perfection.
  • Interest income sensitivity to rate cutsSeverity: medium (structural, managed). Wise earns interest on £29.4bn customer balances. In H1 FY26 total interest income was £297.4m but only £91.5m (first 1% yield) counts toward Underlying PBT. The ~£206m “above 1%” is treated as cyclical — honest framing. If central bank rates fell to zero, Underlying PBT unaffected by design, but reported PBT would fall ~40%. Above-1% interest fell from £230m (H1 FY25) to £206m (H1 FY26) as yields declined.
  • Regulatory complexity and compliance burdenSeverity: medium. 70+ licenses across 160+ countries. MMET consent order ($4.2m, July 2025) small in dollars but a reminder that examinations can produce penalties and remediation programs. Operating a regulated cross-border payments business globally means compliance costs grow with scale (corporate/infrastructure costs +35% in H1 FY26 to £131m). US OCC trust charter application pending — approval would be positive but the process is slow and uncertain.
  • Founder-CEO governance history (historical, resolved)Severity: low. Käärmann was publicly fined by HMRC in 2021 for a late self-assessment filing. Resolved. Not a current operational concern, but some institutional investors apply a governance discount. His ~£4bn stake means interests are aligned, but the historical matter persists in some ESG screens.
  • Take-rate compression (by design)Severity: low (not a concern at current trajectory). 67bps → 51bps over two years. In isolation looks like pricing pressure; in context, it is the strategy. Volume growth (25%+) has more than offset rate cuts at every step: FY26 underlying income +18% despite take-rate down 4bps. Risk would emerge only if volume growth slowed below ~10% while take-rates continued falling — not in sight at 0.57% market share.
  • Stablecoin / crypto disruption (reframed as opportunity)Severity: low. Consistent Wise position: stablecoins solve USD-to-USD. The hardest, most valuable problem (multi-currency local-payment-system conversion) is Wise's infrastructure. If stablecoins grow, Wise is the regulated on/off ramp. Company is explicitly “not making a bet on one payment scheme over another.”
SourceWISE-DOSSIER.md §6 [1]
Verdict

Hold · do not add at current price; do not sell

Last reviewed May 25, 2026 after Q4 FY26 Trading Update · Next review Jun–Jul 2026 (FY26 full-year)
References

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